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CARL J. BAUER

Slippery Property Rights: Multiple
Water Uses and the Neoliberal Model
in Chile, 1981-1995
ABSTRACT

Fifteen years ago Chile adopted a neoliberal Water Code characterized by strong private property rights,market forces and incentives, and weak state regulation. Chile remains the leading international example offree market water policies. Coordinatingmultiple water uses is left to private bargainingamong the owners of
water rights,with conflicts going to ajudiciarythat has expanded

powers. A case study of irrigation-hydroelectricrelationsshows the
current model for river basin management to have seriousflaws.
The results highlight some of the limitations of free market

environmental policies, particularlytheir dependence on effective
legal and institutionalframeworks.

In recent years, the popularity of free markets has spread to problems of environmental regulation and natural resource management.
"Market-friendly" policies have been proposed to help solve a wide variety
of these problems, including those involving water use. This article
examines the case of water rights and river basin management in
contemporary Chile, a rare example of the application of strong free market
policies. The model has had mixed results; the task of coordinating multiple
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water uses has proven especially difficult. The Chilean case demonstrates
the importance of legal and institutional frameworks to how markets work
or fail to work. Many proponents of market-friendly environmental policies,
particularly economists, oversimplify two crucial processes that market
forces depend on but cannot carry out themselves: "defining" property
rights and resolving conflicts.
Advocates of free market environmental and water policies base
their arguments on dominant traditions in neo-classical economics and the
related field of "law-and-economics," particularly the laissez-faire views
associated with the University of Chicago.' It is important not to caricature
this approach or to set up the Chicago school as a straw man, since at its
best the approach is sophisticated and nuanced. However, it is often the
cruder versions that shape debate on public policy. Much of the analysis
revolves around property rights. Advocates of markets argue that markets
increase economic efficiency by allocating resources to their most valuable
uses. Because the essence of the market is exchange, property rights must
be legally defined as private, exclusive and transferable. Secure ownership
is an incentive to invest in greater productivity of resource use, while
freedom to trade provides the flexibility to reallocate rights according to
changing social demands. From this perspective the state should intervene
in private activities as little as possible, aiming instead to protect property,
reduce transactions costs, and enforce contracts.
Such policies also draw on the benefits of the price system. Prices
allow things with different values to be measured and compared; the ease
with which they coordinate dispersed information and individual
preferences is one of the market's great advantages over central planning.
By distorting prices, state regulations and subsidies commonly distort patterns of resource use and reduce efficiency. Market incentives help to "get
prices right," to use the common phrase, thereby stimulating people to use
resources more efficiently as demands increase. In theory, these incentives

1. See generally the following works by important representatives of the "Chicago"
perspective: Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The PropertyRight Paradigm,33 J. ECON.

HISTORY 16 (1973); RONALD HARRY COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988);
ROBERT COoTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcs (1988); MiLTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALSM

AND FREEDOM (1962); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (3rd ed. 1986). The
same perspective is applied to environmental issues in TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R.
LEA4 FREE MARET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEV. REPORT 1992: DEv.
AND THE ENV'T (1992). It is applied to water resources in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONuMET (Terry Lee Anderson ed., 1983); Mark
W. Rosegrant & H. Binswanger, Markets in Tradable WaterRights: Potentialfor Efficiency Gains
in Developing Country Water Resource Allocation, 22 WORLD DEv. 1613 (1994); MARK W.
ROSEGRANT & RENATO GAZMURI SCHLEYER, TRADABLE WATER RIGHTS: EXPERIENCES IN
REFORMING WATER ALLOCATION POLICY (USAID (U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.), ISPAN

(Irrigation Support Project for Asia & the Near East) Report No. 68,1994).
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also force rights-holders to consider the external costs of their actions, i.e.,
their impact on other rights-holders and on the environment. According to
this view, often popularly known as the "Coase Theorem," private bargaining among property owners is better than state regulation at
internalizing externalities, provided that transactions costs are low.2
In US. water policy, the Chicago school is influential in debate but
generally considered too extreme to put into practice. While there is a great
deal of interest in water markets, many people who see their potential
advantages nonetheless oppose a laissez-faire approach. Many of those
opposed are economists arguing in orthodox terms that water resources
involve public goods and market failures. 3 Free market doctrines have been
much more influential in Latin America, both in Chile and other countries,
where they are often called "neoliberal."4 The World Bank has strongly
promoted neoliberal policies.5 Neoliberal economists tend to downplay the
importance of market failures and focus instead on state failures.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Chilean military government
adopted neoliberal approaches to many of its economic and social policies.
Because water resources are especially critical in Chile's semi-arid climate,
the government passed a new Water Code in 1981 that radically
restructured the previous water rights system along neoliberal lines. Water
rights are now considered fully private property. Their owners have wide

2. See, e.g., Rosegrant & Binswanger, Rosegrant & Gazmuri, WORLD BANK, supra note
1. The Coase Theorem has been expressed in varying forms and has been the subject of
countless pages of analysis and commentary, which I do not propose to review in this article.
See generally Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); COOrER & ULEN,
supra note 1; Alan Randall, Coasian Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
J.35 (1974); Warren J.Samuels, The Coase Theorem and the Study ofLaw and Economics, 14 NAT.
RESOURcESJ. 1 (1974). Ronald Coase himself has criticized much of the theorem's application
by others, particularly the assumption of low transactions costs. See COASE, supra note 1, at
1-31.
3. See generally Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and Weaknesses of Water Markets as they
Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereignty Interests in the West, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 489 (1989);
SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (Kenneth D. Frederick, ed., 1986); MARIE LEIGH
LrVmGsTON, DESIGNING WATER INsrTUIONs: MARKET FAILURES AND INSTUTIONAL RESPONSE,
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.1227,1993); BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID
B. BusH,WATER MARKETS INTHEORY AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987); Zach Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget: The Case of Markets,
Water, and the Environment, 15 HAR. J.L. &PUB.POL'Y 391 (1992).
4. "Neoliberal" refers to a revival of 19th century economic liberalism, not the liberal
tradition in US. politics. In the United States, the same views would be called "conservative"
or 'neoconservative."
5. WORLD BANK, supra note 1; WORLD BANK, Peru: A User-based Approach to Water
Management and Irrigation Dev., Sector Report No.13642 (1994). For a further discussion of
the Bank's views on water policy, see Carl J.Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth. The
PoliticalEconomy of Water Rights in Chile, 1976-95, 25 WORLD DEV. 639 (1997).
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autonomy over how they are used. Market mechanisms and incentives are
prominent, and the regulatory powers of the state water agency are greatly
reduced. The task of coordinating different water uses at the level of river
basins is left mainly to voluntary bargaining among private rights-holders
and their organizations. Because state administrative intervention is so
limited, when bargaining fails the conflicts are supposed to be settled by the
ordinary civil courts, which have expanded powers under the 1980
Constitution. River basin management has been somewhat complicated by
the Water Code's creation of a new kind of property right for "nonconsumptive" water uses, mainly hydroelectric power generation.
Part I of this paper describes Chile's 1980 Constitution and "new
institutional order," emphasizing the new role of the courts. Part II
summarizes the 1981 Water Code and highlights its provisions for multiple
water use. Part III addresses judicial activity in water rights cases. The focus
then shifts to the specific problems raised by non-consumptive rights in Part
IV. Part V illustrates these issues with a case study of irrigation-vs.hydroelectric conflicts in the Maule and Bio Bio River basins in southcentral Chile. Finally, Part VI discusses the relationship between these
issues and recent debates in Chile over reforms to river basin management.
The Chilean case demonstrates some of the limitations of market-driven
water policies, and highlights their dependence on legal and institutional
structures.6
I. THE "NEW INSTITUTIONAL ORDER": THE "ECONOMIC"
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW ROLE OF THE COURTS
The essential features of the 1981 Water Code reflect the economic
model and nueva institucionalidad(new institutional order) established by
the Chilean military government, which was in power from 1973 to 1990.
The government and its civilian advisors sought to radically transform
Chilean society and political economy and to consolidate and

6. In this paper I do not discuss the Chilean water market itself, since for the most part
sales of water rights are confined to the agricultural sector. See CARL J. BAUER, AGAINsT THE
CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETs, AND THE STATE IN CHILE (forthcoming 1998);

Bauer, supra note 5.
In addition to the documents and other evidence cited in this article, I also draw
extensively from interviews with dozens of people in Chile between 1991 and 1995, both in
the local study areas and at the national level in Santiago. They include farmers, engineers
and administrators of the more important private canal associations, engineers and
managers of electric power companies, government functionaries in the local, regional, and
national offices of various agencies in the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works,
lawyers working in water rights, staff of non-governmental organizations working in
agricultural and rural development, university professors, and experts in United Nations
organizations. I am grateful to all of them for their cooperation.
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institutionalize the changes. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the government
adopted a series of economic policies that favored free markets, private
ownership and enterprise, and the free flow of international capital and
trade. At the same time, the government sharply reduced the state's role in
economic planning, production, and provision of social services. The
program was designed by a group of neoliberal economists known as "los
Chicago Boys," so called because of their training in the free market and
monetarist views of the University of Chicago. As measures protecting
national industry from foreign competition were dismantled, economic
activities shifted to export-led development based on the country's rich and
diverse natural resources: minerals, forests, agriculture, and fish. After a
decade of adjustment, temporary boom, and crisis, the economy has grown
steadily since 1985 and has become the envy of many other developing
countries. Chile is widely considered a textbook example of successful free
market reforms. In 1990, a civilian government came into power, a centerleft coalition made up of the military regime's political opponents, called
the Concertaci6n de Partidos por la Democracia ("Concertaci6n").' The
Concertaci6n has retained, essentially unchanged, the economic model
established by the military government. 9
In the formative period from the mid-1970s to early 1980s, the
military government accompanied its economic program with a sustained
effort to redesign the political system. The effort culminated in 1980 with
the adoption of a new Constitution, which is still in effect.10 The previous
Constitution of 1925 had established a presidentialist democracy. It had
both a strong executive branch and a relatively strong legislature, in a
pluralist political system with political parties playing a central role. The
military and its civilian advisors criticized the 1925 Constitution and its
associated political system for having been too weak to prevent the growth
of radical movements and social polarization in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Those movements and polarization finally led to the military coup in 1973.

7. Andrs G6mez-Lobo, Las ConsecuenciasAmbientales de la Apertura Comercialen Chile
(Colecci6n Estudios Cieplan No.35,1992).
8. Coalition of Parties for Democracy.
9. The political and economic changes under the military government have been
extensively studied. See THE CHILEAN ECONOMY: POLICY LESSONS AND CHALLENGES (Barry P.
Bosworth et al. eds., 1994); HERNAN BOcH- Buc, LA TRANSFORMACION ECONOMICA DE CHILE:
DEL ESrATISMO A LA LBERTAD ECONOCA (1993); PAMELA CoNsrABLE & ARTURO VALENZuELA,
A NATION OF ENEMES: CHILE UNDER PINOcHET (1991); THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
CHILE, 1982-90 (Paul W. Drake & Ivan Jaksic eds., 1991); BRIAN LOVEMAN, CHILE: THE LEGACY
OF HISPANIC CAPITALISM (1988); MILITARY RULE IN CHILE: DICTATORSHIP AND OPPOSITIONS
(Arturo Valenzuela & J. Samuel Valenzuela eds., 1986); EL MODELO ECONOMICO CHILENO
(Daniel L. Wisecarver ed., 1992).
10. CoNTuaON POLtnCADE LA RE
LCA DE CHILE. For a more extensive discussion
of the nature and significance of the Constitution, see BAUER, supra note 6, chap. II.
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In contrast to the 1925 Constitution, the 1980 Constitution combines an
overall ideological vision of society and state with a detailed legal blueprint
for a "new institutional order" to make the vision concrete.11 The
Constitution expands and fortifies private property rights and economic
liberties while limiting the state's economic activities to a "subsidiary"
role. 2 It separates organizations of civil society from political parties in
order to reduce the latter's influence. It redefines the separation of powers
within the government in order to increase technocratic authority and
restrict popular sovereignty and participation. Thus, the 1980 Constitution
strengthens the executive branch and weakens the legislative branch,
counter-balancing the former by creating or strengthening several
autonomous, non-elected institutions. 3 The Constitution's drafters argued
that these institutions were "technical" and "non-political" because their
members were not elected and therefore not beholden to political parties. 4
The Constitution does not explicitly require a market economy.
However, it aims to guarantee the legal, political, and social conditions
necessary for such an economy to develop. Most analyses of the
Constitution, both Chilean and foreign, have been political in nature,
generally focusing on the Constitution's authoritarian and anti-democratic
features. 5 The Constitution's economic significance has been largely

11. General sources on the 1980 Constitution include NEVILLE BLANc uT AL., LA
CONSrucION CHILNA (1990); CONSTITuON POLITICA DR LA RE"OBLICA DE CHLE:
CONCORDANcIAS, ANOTAcIONES Y Fue'rrEs (Luz Bulnes Aldunate ed., 1981); Jos9 Luis CEA
EGARA, TRATADO DE LA CONSTITUCION DE 1980: CARACrISrcAs GENERALEs, GARANTIAS

CONSTnTUCIONALES (1988). The views of the Constitution's principal architect are collected
in El Miedo y Otros Escritos: El Pensamientode Jaime Guzmdn Errdzuriz 251 (Arturo Fontaine
Talavera ed., Revista de Estudios Pdblicos No.42,1991).
12. The Constitution also adds a new but fairly weak right "to live in an environment
free of contamination." CoNsmTYucuON POUTICADELARI3jBLICADE CHILE art. 19(8).

13. Those institutions are the Armed Forces, Constitutional Tribunal, Judicial Power,
National Security Council, and Central Bank. In addition, the Senate includes a number of
senators who are "designated" by these institutions rather than popularly elected. See
generally supra note 11.
14. See Fontaine, supra note 11.
15. For foreign commentary see Alan Angell, The Transition to Democracy in Chile: A
Model or an Exceptional Case?,46 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 563 (1993); Mark Ensalaco, In with
the New, Out with the Old? The DemocratizingImpact of Constitutional Reform in Chile, 15
CANADIAN J.LATIN AM. &CAMBBEAN STUDIES 409 (1994); Brian Loveman, ,Misidn Cumplida?
Civil-Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition,33 J. INTERAMECAN STUDIES &
WORLD AFFAIRS, Fall 1991, at 35; Anthony Holland O'Malley, Chile's Constitution, Chile's
Congress: Prospectsfor Judicial, Legal, and ConstitutionalReform, 15 CANADIAN J. LATIN AM. &
CARIBBEAN STUDIES 85 (1994); Arturo Valenzuela, The Military in Power: The Consolidationof
One-Man Rule, in Drake & Jaksic eds., supra note 9. Chilean commentary includes INSTITUTO
CHILENO DE ESTUDIOS HUMANIsrICOS, UNA SALIDA POLITICO CONSTITUCIONAL PARA CHILE :

ExposicIoNEs Y DEBATE DEL SEMNARIO "UN S

rEMAJURfDICO-PoLT

CONS1TU(CoNALPARA
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ignored, except for brief comments on the importance of political stability
and secure private property rights. The Constitution establishes what is
called the "public economic order," which consists of broad private economic rights and liberties accompanied by sharp limits on state economic
activities and regulatory powers.6 Some of the more authoritarian political
features were removed in 1989 in reforms negotiated between the military,
the incoming Concertaci6n government, and the largest right-wing political
party. 7 The economic provisions were untouched. Thus, having gained
legitimacy through the reform but with its essential structure intact, the
Constitution has been maintained through the transition to democratic rule.
An often-overlooked feature of the current framework is the
expanded power of the judiciary. The courts play a strategic role in a legaleconomic model dominated by private initiative. The Chilean courts now
have broad and flexible authority to protect private constitutional rights
and to control state administrative actions. Historically such judicial review
was considered a violation of the separation of powers in Chile, a reflection
of the civil law tradition. 8 The 1925 Constitution provided for special
administrative courts to be established independently of the ordinary
judiciary, with authority over disputes between private parties and state
agencies. However, Congress never passed the enabling legislation needed
to set up the special courts, and in their absence the ordinary courts refused
to assume jurisdiction. For nearly fifty years, the supreme court insisted that
without explicit constitutional mention it could not review administrative
actions. Injured parties were left with no legal recourse during the decades

CHILE" (1985); LA CONSMICJON DE 1980: UNDtcIMAs JORNADAS DE DERECHO PODUCO,
NOVIEmBRE 1980 (Revista de Derecho Pfiblico Nos.29-30,1981).
16. BAUER, supra note 6, at chap. II; CEA EGARA, supra note 11; ENRIQUE EVANS DE LA
CUADRA, Los DERCcIOS CONs'rTuCIONALES (1986).
17. See Ensalaco, Loveman, O'Malley, supra note 15. Chile's foremost political journalist
puts the 1989 reforms at the heart of his analysis of the transition to democracy, ASCANIO
CAVALLO, LOS HOMBRES DR LA TRANSICION (1992). The right-wing political party is
Renovaci6n Nacional.
18. Civil law systems have a somewhat different notion of the separation of governmental powers than common law systems. In civil law systems, the judiciary has a position
subordinate to the legislative and executive branches. Only the latter two have the authority
and legitimacy to make laws, while the function of judges is limited to applying those laws.
This division of authority is reinforced by the traditional distinction between private law and
public law. "Private law" concerns the relations among individuals (about family, commerce,
property, etc.), while "public law" deals with the state and its relations with its citizens-the
former fails within the judicial realm, but not the latter. See Nicholas D. S. Brumm, Divergent
Models ofPublic Law in Latin America: A Historicaland PrescriptiveAnalysis, 24 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 1 (1992); KaN
KARST & KEITH ROSENN, LAW AND DEvELOPMNT IN LATIN
AMERICA: A CASE BOOK (1975); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADmON (2d ed.
1985); MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COUR: A COMPARATIv AN POLmCAL ANALYSIS (1981); TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE Op THE JUDICIARY (Irwin Stotzky ed., 1993).
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of greatest expansion of the modem regulatory state, culminating in the
reformist government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and the
socialist government of Salvador Allende (1970-1973). 9 The Agrarian
Reform of 1967-73 was the most prominent example of expanding state
intervention at the expense of private property rights, which courts were
powerless to control.
To combat this tendency, the military government created a new
legal action to assert and defend constitutional rights called the recurso de
protecci6n. The recurso is one of the Constitution's major innovations. It
grants standing in a wide variety of situations for people to request immediate judicial review of alleged violations of their rights, whether by state
agencies or by private parties.' These suits go directly to the regional
appellate courts. The courts are supposed to rule quickly and have broad
authority to order whatever measures they may "judge necessary to reestablish the rule of law and the due protection of the affected person."'
This authority, analogous to US. courts' power to order injunctive relief, is
a new power for Chilean courts whose remedies have traditionally been
limited to ordering payment of financial damages. In theory, decisions on
recursos are designed to remedy an immediate wrong, not to substitute for
the more thorough civil procedures needed to sort through complex problems. Even so, the new judicial control over the administration has arguably made special administrative courts unnecessary. The appellate courts'
decisions on recursosde protecci6n are often appealed to the supreme court.'
In practice, the recurso de protecci6n has had its strengths and
weaknesses. Most Chilean lawyers like it: it is often a fast and effective way

19. The situation has been much discussed and criticized by Chilean legal scholars. See,
e.g., Hugo Caldera, Los Tribunales Ordinarios de Justiciay el Control de Constitucionalidaddel
Acto Administrativo 191, (Revista de Derecho Pfblico Nos. 39-40, 1986); Ronaldo Pantoja
Bauza, Los TribunalesContencioso Administrativosen la Constituti6n Polftica de 1980,82 GACETA
JURIDICA 3 (1987); Lautaro Rios Alvarez, Los Tribunalesde lo Contencioso Administrativoy el
Art. 38 de IaNueua Constitucidn, 195 (Revista de Derecho PNlblico Nos. 29-30,1981); EDUARDO
SOTO KLOSS, EL RECURSO DE PROTECcION: ORIGENS, DOCrRUNA YJURISPRUDENCIA (1982).
20. Suit or petition for protection.
21. The recurso was first established in 1976 in Constitutional Act No.3, and then
included in the 1980 Constitution as Article 20. CoNErruciON POLtICA DE LA REPOBLiCA DE
Q= art. 20. It was patterned after the existing recursode amparo, which allowed immediate
judicial review of state deprivations of individual freedom (similar to habeus corpus in other
legal systems). The classic text on the recursode proteccidnis SOTO KLOSs, supra note 19. See
also CRA EGARA, supranote 11; EVANS DE LA CUADRA, supra note 16.
22. CoNsrirulON POLItCADE LA REPOBUCA DE CHILE art. 20.
23. The right to live in a clean environment can be defended only by a weaker and more
restricted recursode protecci6n. See supranote 12. To win a normal recurso the plaintiff must
show the defendant's "act or omission" to be "arbitrary or illegal"; to win an environmental
recurso,the defendant's "act" (not omission) must be "arbitrary and illegal." See SOTO KLOSS,
supranote 19, CEA EGAlA, supranote 11, EVANS DE LA CUADRA, supra note 16.
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to get a response from a legal system plagued by formalities and delays.
Although it is an ad hoc response, to the people involved that may be better
than no response, at least in the short run. The popularity of the recurso has
grown as a result of its speed and it has become a commonly used tactic in
the routine practice of law.24 The leading national expert on the recurso
argues that it has caused a "silent revolution" in judicial performance, as
judges have begun to wield their new powers actively and creatively.'
Other legal experts agree that the recurso is in effect creating administrative
law, although they have differing views about the results.'
But the recurso's speed and ad hoc character are also its flaws.'
Some experts argue that although the recurso is a useful device, it is not an
adequate substitute for systematic administrative law. Appellate courts
throughout the country have been faced with growing numbers of these
recursos, often involving economic and regulatory issues with significant
policy implications. Judges are forced to decide cases with limited information or technical expertise, few legislative or constitutional guidelines,
and little time for deliberation. While their decisions may be creative and
flexible, not surprisingly they are also unpredictable and sometimes
contradictory. Nonetheless, the recurso is so popular that despite its limited
purpose and scope, it has in fact replaced many of the slower, declarative
procedures of the lower courts. Neither the appellate courts nor the
supreme court have so far provided much unifying or systematic doctrine
in this area. Nor will court decisions evolve in the incremental way familiar
to common law systems, since in Chile, as in other civil law systems, such
decisions do not establish binding precedents for other cases.'
The pros and cons of the recurso de protecci6n reflect the general
condition of the judicial systen. This is the subject of many debates in Chile
where it is widely agreed that modernizing the system is overdue." Some

24. This is sometimes called the "constitutionalization" of private law: lawyers now
carry their copy of the Constitution to court, whereas before it was of interest only to

scholars. Interview with Jos6 Bidart, Law Professor, University of Concepci6n, in
Concepci6n, Chile (Dec. 17,1992).
25. Eduardo Soto Kloss, 1976-1986: Diez Aflos de Recurso de Protecci6n:Una Revoluci6n
Silenciosa, 83 REVtsTA DE DERECHO & JuRmsRuDENcIA 157 (1986).
26. See generally Arturo Aylwin Az6car, Relaci6n de ia Comisidn Derecha Administrativo,
11 REVISrA CILENA DERECHO 519 (1984); Pedro Pierry Arrau, Lo ContenciosoAdministrativo
en la Constituci6nPolftica de 1980: Campetencia del PaderJudicialHasta la Dictaci6n de ia Ley, 2930 REVIS1rA DERECHO POBuCO 209 (1981); Alejandro Vergara Blanco, La Propetarizact6nde los
Derechos,14 REVIS"A DERECHO U. CATOLICA VAuARAISo 281 (1991).
27. See generally supranote 26.
28. See generally supranote 18 and accompanying text.
29. COMISION DE ESTUDIOS DEL SISrEmA JUDICIAL CHILENO, PRoposicIoNEs PARA LA
REFORMA JUDICIAL (1991); JUAN ENRIQUE VARGAS & JORGE CORREA SUTIL, DIAGNOSTICO DEL
SISTEMA JUDICIAL CHILENO (1995).
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reforms depend primarily on increased funding and administrative support.3 Other problems, however, are deeply rooted in the Chilean legal
tradition. Unlike the common law system, Chilean judges have a highly
formalistic and narrowly defined view of their job. They perceive their job
as applying the law, not making it. They prefer strict and literal interpretation and generally refuse to consider non-legal factors, tendencies which are
most pronounced in the higher courts?' As a result, judges lack the training,
experience, or inclination to enter substantive policy issues. They typically
decide cases on strictly formal grounds. However, criticizing judicial
behavior is politically sensitive in Chile, and both the courts and other
conservative interests have blocked the more ambitious proposed reforms.
The courts now have a curious hybrid position in Chilean political
economy and public policy. They have a more critical and strategic role to
play, and more and wider powers with which to play it. Both changes shift
the courts towards the common law model of active and independent
judges. On the other hand, the Chilean judiciary remains dominated by a
legal and professional tradition that is ill-prepared for such a change. In
addition, the system is handicapped by its lack of financial and
administrative resources. 32
II. A NEOLIBERAL WATER LAW: FRAMEWORK FOR RIVER
BASIN MANAGEMENT
In 1981, the Chilean military government adopted a new Water
Code that reflected the overall economic and political model it was putting
into place.' The new Code reversed the principles of the previous Water
Code, which had been passed in 1967 as part of the controversial Agrarian
Reform Law. The Agrarian Reform aimed to expropriate and redistribute
large landholdings with the dual purposes of expanding the class of small

30. Jaime Del Valle, El Fortalecimientodel Poder Judicial Chileno 15 (REvIsTA CHILENA
DERECHO 37 (1988); Josd Marfa Eyzaguirre, Los Problemasdel PoderJudicial, EL MERCURIO, June
5,1992, at A2.
31. Enrique Barros, Tensiones del Derecho Actual, 88 REvISTA DERECHO &JURISPRUDENCIA
9 (1991); COML9ON DE EsTUDIOS DEL SISTEMA JUDICIAL CHJLENO, supra note 29; Pablo Rufz-

Tagle, Andlisis Comnparadode [a Funcid6n Judicial,39 REVISTA ESTUDIOS POBRUCOS 131 (1990). See
generally supranote 18 and accompanying text. On the supreme court, see Gaston G6mez,
Corte Suprema: Andlisis de Algunos de sus Comportarnientos,82 GACETA JURIDICA 15 (1987);
Eugenio Somarriva Valenzuela, Labor Jurisdiccionalde la Corte Suprema, COMISICN DE EsnUDIOS
DEL SmE

JUDICIAL CHILENO, supranote 29, at 141-77 (1991).

32. BAUER, supranote 6, chap. II. See generally supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33. The Code was dictated on October 29,1981, as Decree with Force of Law (DFL) 1,122
(Chile Diario Oficial). In Chile, a DFL is issued by the executive but has the force of
legislation. See CEA ECA&A, supranote 11.

Winter 1998]

NEOLIBERAL MODEL ON CHILE

landholders and modernizing agricultural production.' In Chile's semi-arid
climate, agriculture requires irrigation. Therefore, land reform also had to
redistribute water. The law sharply increased state authority over water
rights and was accompanied by a constitutional amendment declaring all
existing water rights to be public property.5 In contrast, the 1981 Code
enlarged and strengthened private property rights, separated water rights
from land ownership, promoted market forces and mechanisms, and
reduced the state's role in water resource management and regulation. The
Code remains in effect essentially unchanged in spite of several attempted
reforms by the Concertaci6n government that has been in power since
1990.36
The 1981 Water Code has two main objectives that reflect the
different interests within the government that were pushing for reform: first
to increase the legal security of private water rights, thereby putting an end
to the confusion over ownership left by the Agrarian Reform, and second,
to raise the efficiency and productive value of water uses by relying on
market forces. Farmers and other agricultural interests supported the first
objective, as did most water lawyers and irrigation engineers in both the
public and private sectors. They argued that secure property rights would
encourage investment in irrigation and revitalize the dormant canal users'
associations. Neoliberal economists favored both objectives. They argued
that the real boost in efficiency would come from price incentives and
private trading. Market mechanisms would motivate people to save water
in order to sell the surplus, and to transfer rights to higher-valued uses
within agriculture or to other sectors of the economy. The final version of
the Code was a compromise negotiated between the two positions. In
particular, agricultural interests and their allies defeated a proposal to

34. See Jost ROJAS

GARRiDo ST AL., HISFORIA DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA EN CHILE (1988);

LovELLS. JARViS, CH
AGRICULTURE UNDER MIL ruAY RULE: FROM REFORM TO REACnON,
1973-1980 (1985); Lovell S. Jarvis, The Unraveling of Chile's Agrarian Reform, 1973-1986, in
WILuAM C. THaSENHusE, SEARCHING FOR AGRARIAN REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, 240-75
(1988); Law of Agrarian Reform, No. 16,640 (D.O. 1967).
35. The 1967 law's provisions on water rights (c6digo de aguas; con las modificaciones
introducidas por la ley no. 16.640, sobre reforma agraria) were published separately as a
Water Code, DFL No.162 (Chile 1969). This was Chile's second code. The first was passed
in 1951. For historical background see generally Bauer, supranote 5, and BAUER, supranote
6, chap. III.
36. Overviews of the 1981 Water Code can be found in Bauer, supranote 5; BAUER, supra
note 6, chap. III; and also Carl J.Bauer, Los Derechos de Agua y el Mercado: Efectos e Implicancias
del C6digo de Aguas Chileno de 1981, 4 REVISrA DE DERECHO DE AGUAS 17 (1993). See also
MONICA RIOS BREM & JORGE QUIROZ CAso,To MARKET OF WATER RIGHIirN CuLm MAJOR
Issuss (World Bank Technical Paper No. 285,1995); Rosegrant & Gazmuri, supra note 1.
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promote reallocation of water rights by taxing them separately from land,
which neoliberals had argued was vital to the new systemY
In form, the new Code declares that water is public property, to
which the state can grant private rights of use. In substance, however, the
Code strengthens private control over use-rights in several innovative ways.
For the first time in Chilean history, water rights are now completely
separate from land ownership. They can be freely bought, sold, mortgaged,
and transferred like real estate. The state water rights agency, the Direcci6n
General de Aguas (DGA),9 grants requests for new rights free of charge
whenever water is physically and legally available. However, once constituted, all water rights are governed by private or civil law rather than
public or administrative law. They are subject to the general system of real
estate title registration and are fully protected as private property under the
1980 Constitution. 9 The Code also recognizes all rights granted or acquired
under previous laws. In theory, all water rights must be measured in terms

37. Bauer, supranote 5, and BAUER,supra note 6, chap. III.
38. General Water Directorate.
39.

CONSrTIUCION PoLtncA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE art. 19(24). The Code declares

waters to be "national property of public use" (bienes nacionales de uso pablico), a legal
category which by definition cannot be alienated from public ownership nor enter into
private commercial relations. Other examples of this category include roads, streets, plazas,
bridges, and beaches. Ownership in Chilean civil law includes the rights to arbitrarily use,
enjoy, and dispose of (alienate) the thing owned, as long as others' rights are not affected.
Civil Code, Articles 582-583. Thus, an individual can own a water right but not the water
itself, since it is only the former that he is free to sell. The distinction seems artificial, and
indeed many Chilean water lawyers-even if personally pro-market-consider the Water
Code to be juridically incoherent, effectively privatizing a resource which it simultaneously
defines as inalienably public. Jorge Ellenberg, Antecedentes Respecto del Nuevo Regimen
Legal de Aguas (1980) (unpublished law thesis, Universidad de Chile) (on file with author);
Luis Soriano, Las Aguas en Nuestro Derecho (1986) (unpublished law thesis, Universidad
de Concepci6n) (on file with author); Alejandro Vergara Blanco, Contribucidna laHistoriadel
Derechode Aguas, I: Fuentesy Principiosdel Derecho de Aguas Chileno Contempordneo, 1818-1981,
1 REVISTA DE DERECHO DE MINAS & AGUAS 111 (1990); Alejandro Vergara Blanco, Hip6tesis
para una Reconstruccdn Historicay Dogradticadel Derecho de Aguas, 49 REVISTA DERECHO

POBuCO 217 (1991). Others defend the Code's definition as the only way to harmonize
market logic with the essential "peculiarity' of the resource. See BERNARDINO ESCUDERO
AHUMADA,LA POSESION DEL DERECHO DE APROVECHAMENTO DE AGUAS (1990); Luis Sim6n
Figueroa del Rio, Estatuto Jurfico de las Aguas: Evolucidn Histdricay Cultural 25 (DERECHO EN
LA REGION No. 1, 1992); Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, AnAlisis y Comentario de la

Propuesta Reforma del C6digo de Aguas (1993) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
The legal distinction between public ownership of water and private ownership of
water rights is also common in the Western United States. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL.,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES (1991). However, in the U.S. the scope for public
regulation of such private rights is much broader than in Chile.
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of volume per unit of time, e.g. liters per second, but in practice many are
expressed as proportional shares of available flows.4"
Compared to earlier legislation, private liberties are extensive and
state authority is constrained. Rights-holders can freely change the location
and use of water rights without administrative approval by the DGA. 4'
Applicants for new rights no longer have to specify or justify their intended
uses to the DGA. The agency has no discretion to deny such requests if
there is water available, nor to decide whom among competing applicants
will receive water.42 If there is not enough water to satisfy simultaneous
applications, the DGA must hold a public auction and sell the new rights to
the highest bidder.' Rights-holders pay no taxes or fees for acquiring rights
from the state or for keeping them over time. Unlike earlier laws, they now
have no obligation to use their rights and face no penalty or risk of
cancellation for lack of use. Such measures were left out of the Code
because they were considered invasions of private liberty. Taken together,
these provisions allow unregulated speculation in water rights.'
The DGA now has little authority over private water use, except
during official drought emergencies. Most water management decisions are
made by private individuals and especially by private canal users' associations, which have a celebrated tradition in Chile of building and operating canals and distributing water rights.' The DGA can neither cancel nor
restrict water rights once granted or recognized, except by expropriating
and paying for them. Moreover, the ordinary courts now have the adjudicatory powers over water use conflicts formerly exercised by the DGA.'
Nonetheless, the agency retains several important technical and
administrative functions, such as gathering and maintaining hydrologic
data, inspecting larger water works such as dams and canals, enforcing the
rules governing private water users' organizations, and keeping official,
though incomplete, registries of water rights and users' organizations. The
DGA also prepares studies, plans and policy recommendations, none of

40. See generally supra note 36.
41. An exception is the DGA approval required when changing the location of
diversions from a natural water-course, Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, art. 163 (Chile 1981).
42. Earlier legislation had established a list of different uses in order of priority. See
generally supra note 35.
43. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, arts. 141-50 (Chile 1981).
44. In other words, there is no requirement of "beneficial use" as in the Western United
States. SAX, supra note 39, at 164-69.
45. Raul Matus, Antecedentes Hist6ricosdel Riego en Chile: Situacu6n Actual y Perspectivas
Futuras, in PRIMERA CONVENCION NACIONAL DE REGANTES DE CHILE, at 70-81 (1986);
FERNANDO PERALTA T., IDEAS PARA LA DISCUSION DE UNA PoLTicA DE RMGO: SU APLiCACION
EN EL CAso DE CHILE (1989). Some three fourths of Chile's irrigated land is watered by private
canals built before 1920, and the rest by state projects built since then.
46. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, arts. 177-85 (Chile 1981).
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which have regulatory force unless approved by other branches of
government.47
The Water Code does not mandate or establish a market in water
rights. Rather, it attempts to set up the legal preconditions for such a market
to emerge spontaneously.m Because its main concern is irrigation, the Code
does little to address multiple water uses or river basin management. The
exception is the creation of "non-consumptive" water rights, discussed
below in Parts IV and V. The Code grants autonomy in routine administration to several kinds of private water users' organizations, but all of these
are designed solely for irrigation.49 Therefore, coordinating the relations
among agricultural, industrial, hydroelectric, domestic and other water uses
depends on the Code's general logic rather than on specific provisions. In
other words, coordination depends on voluntary bargaining and negotiation among private rights-holders and their representatives. Because the
DGA has little power to intervene when private parties dash, conflicts often
go to the courts for resolution. These conflicts have grown in complexity
over the past fifteen years as Chile's economic development has put growing and diverse pressures on water resources. Current river basin problems
include inter-basin water transfers, contamination, and irrigation-hydroelectric relations. 5
III. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN WATER RIGHTS LAW
Legal expertise in water rights issues is scarce in Chile. Few lawyers
or judges know much about the Water Code and even fewer are familiar
with water use in practice. The subject is rarely taught in Chilean law
schools and has never been lucrative enough to attract many lawyers in
private practice. Such a lack of legal expertise is surprising in a semi-arid
country where irrigation is historically important and water disputes are
common in local folklore.5' Apparently, these disputes have historically
been small scale disagreements between neighboring farmers, more readily
settled informally or through private canal associations than by involving
lawyers or courts. Irrigation engineers have traditionally been the most
knowledgeable about water rights in Chile. In the 1990s, the situation has

47. See generally supra note 36.
48. On Chilean water markets in particular, see the works cited supra note 36.
49. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, arts. 186-293 (Chile 1981).
50, See, e.g., CENTRO DE INvEsGAcION Y PLAN1F1CAcION DR MEDiO AMBIENEn,GEsION

AMB'rfALEN

mL ApOmS DL CUARTo ENcUE

CmqN'ICO SOBRE EL MEDO AMBMNTE

(1992).
51. It is a striking contrast to the Western United States where water lawyers abound
and prosper.
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begun to change as the stakes of water problems have grown and
expanded.
Water rights conflicts enter the legal system through either the local
civil courts or the regional appellate courts.s2 The lower courts have had no
role in issues of multiple water use. Rather, their importance has been
mainly within the agricultural sector, regularizing many problems of
uncertain water rights titles and ruling on disputes between neighboring
irrigators. Research in the south-central city of Los Angeles, in the No Blo
River basin, indicates that local judges often do a reasonable job of sorting
through the concrete problems. However, they depend heavily on technical
help from the DGA or from canal associations, and cases suffer the long
delays characteristic of the Chilean legal system. Because the procedures are
slow, costly and unpredictable, very few irrigation disputes are ever taken
to court.5

The higher courts' treatment of water problems has been ambivalent and somewhat erratic.' In many cases, appellate courts and the
supreme court have zealously defended private property rights, vigilant
against errors or abuses by the DGA. For example, the courts have revoked
new water rights granted by the DGA when existing rights-holders showed
that they were injured or that the DGA had given them no chance to
object.' In other cases, the courts have forced the DGA to grant rights by

52. The appellate courts follow the nation's regional administrative structure, with
Regions numbered I through XII from north to south. The Santiago Metropolitan Region in
the center of Chile is numbered XIII.
53. See, BAUER, supra note 6, chap. V. Regularizing title to water rights is discussed in
more detail in Bauer, supra note 5, and BAUER, supra note 6, chaps. III & IV.
54. During 1981-93, there were some 80 higher court decisions published that involved
water rights or the Water Code, DFL No. 1,122 (Chile 1981). Also included here are five
unpublished decisions. About sixty percent of the cases were brought as recursos de
proteccid6n. The remainder were either more conventional appeals or the specialized appeals
provided for in the Water Code (art. 137 establishes a recurso de reclamacidnto appeal DGA
decisions). Overall, half of the cases involved challenges to some action of the DGA. BAUER,
supra note 6, chap. V. Most of the appellate court cases were appealed to the supreme court
(53 of 85 cases). The supreme court reversed less than one quarter of those cases. BAUER,
supra note 6, chap. V.
Chile has no official court reporter to publish higher court decisions, presumably
because judicial precedent is not binding as it is in the common law system. Instead there
are several legal journals, typically associated with universities, whose editors select which
decisions to publish. These are the Revista de Derecho y Jurisprudencia, Gaceta Jurfdica,
Fallos del Mes (Supreme Court decisions only); and as of 1990 the Revista de Derecho de
Minas & Aguas, renamed Revista de Derecho de Aguas in 1993. Although not complete, this
system ensures that the most important decisions are published as well as many less
important ones.
55. See, e.g., Kegan con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1985; Sup. Ct. 1985), 320 FALLOS DEL MES
370(1985).
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declaring its reasons for refusal unfounded.' When in doubt, the courts
tend to give full constitutional protection to water rights whose legal status
is quite debatable. Such rights include those which have never been legally
registered, 7 rights that were granted provisionally under the 1967 Water
Code but never made definitive,"' and newly granted rights which the
government tried to revoke because there had been administrative errors."s
Despite these outcomes, the higher courts have supported the DGA
in two thirds of its conflicts with private parties. Several factors explain this
pattern. First, judges are reluctant to intervene in technical matters beyond
their competence, and often defer to the agency's specialized expertise.'
Second, in a number of cases judges adopt highly formalistic arguments in
order to avoid ruling on substantive policy issues. This tendency is
strongest in the supreme court, which is most removed from the facts of any
particular case.6' Third, the DGA has proven that it is careful to obey the
limits of its regulatory powers and duties. The agency's staff follow a strict
and legalistic interpretation of their functions, wary of being scrutinized by
the courts and by the government's Controller General.' The DGA's administrative behavior is more likely to be passive than interventionist, which
eases the burden of judicial review.
The combination of administrative and judicial formalism works
reasonably well in routine matters. However, it is less effective when more

56. See, e.g., ENDESA con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1991), 2 REViSTA DE DERECHO DE
MINAS & AGUAS 383 (1991).
57. There are a large but unknown number of rights in this category. See generally supra
note 53. The landmark case protecting such rights is Mozo con SENDOS (Ct. App. Arica
1984; Sup. Ct. 1985), 316 FALLOS DEL MEs 33 (1985). In another case, the supreme court
undermined the Water Code's rules designed to regularize titles by declaring that the
registered owner of water rights could not lose them even though someone else had been
using them for twenty years: Colegio de Ingenieros con Guzm&n (Ct. App. Santiago 1990;
Sup. Ct. 1990), 384 FALLOS DEL Mis 662 (1990). The Code's Transitory Articles contain rules
for regularization of titles. Water Code DFL No. 1,122 (Chile 1981).
58. Sociedad de Servicios Urbanos con Contralor General de la Repflblica (Ct. App.
Santiago 1988; Sup. Ct. 1989), 369 FALLOS DEL MES 483 (1989).
59. Compaffla Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1985),
57 GACETAJURIDICA 56 (1985).
60. See, e.g., Sucesi6n GonzAlez con Mac Lean (Ct. App. Punta Arenas 1989), 113 GACETA
JURIDICA 46 (1989); Martini con DGA (Ct. App. Temuco 1987; Sup. Ct. 1987), 343 FALLOS DEL
MiS 308 (1987); Junta de Vigilancia del Rio Teno con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1990; Sup. Ct.
1990), 129 GACTA JURIDICA 107 (1990).
61. See generally supra note 31, and accompanying text.
62. The Controller General is an autonomous state agency which supervises the fine
points of the legal and financial actions of other state administrative entities. As a watchdog,
its powers are more strictly limited than judicial review, but their exercise keeps public
officials highly conscious of the letter of the law. See BuLNEs, supranote 11; CEA EGARA, supra
note 11; see generally supranote 19.
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difficult problems such as river basin conflicts arise. The system tends to
leave a sort of decision-making vacuum, which is typically filled by those
interests with more political influence and the resources to act on their own
behalf. The following two Parts illustrate this point in detail.
IV.

NON-CONSUMPTIVE WATER RIGHTS: OBJECTIVES AND
PROBLEMS

The 1981 Water Code's major innovation in multi-purpose water
management was the creation of a new kind of property right, the "nonconsumptive" water right. A non-consumptive right allows its owner to
divert and use water as long as the water is returned unaltered to its
original channel.' The goal was to encourage hydroelectric power development in the mountains and foothills of the Andes without harming the
existing rights of irrigators downstream in the central valley."4 By 1981,
most of the surface water resources in northern and central Chile had
already been allocated under the system of consumptive rights. By creating
a new category of rights, the government aimed to intensify the use of water
resources without having to compensate the owners of existing rights. It
was a step toward more integrated water management and showed foresight about the growing importance of hydroelectricity.'
Unfortunately, that foresight was limited. The Water Code's rules
about the relation between consumptive and non-consumptive rights are
brief and ambiguous. Coordinating the two has been more difficult than
expected and has revealed some of the Code's flaws. First, it is not clear
under the Code whether either type of right has preference in case of conflict. The Code generally does not recognize priorities among different types

63. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, art. 14 (Chile 1981).
64. The Code does not specify that non-consumptive rights are for hydroelectric power,
although that was certainly their main purpose. Other industrial water uses such as cooling
or processing can also be non-consumptive if they meet the conditions of article 14. So far
non-consumptive rights have not been used for environmental purposes, e.g. to maintain a
minimum flow. Before 1981, all rights were assumed to be consumptive, even if used for
power generation, because of the predominant influence of irrigation. See BAUER, supra note
6, chap. V.
65. Creating non-consumptive rights was like the creation of "contingent" water rights
(derechoseventuales) in the late 19th century, which have carried through to the present Code
(art. 18). Contingent rights are claims to surplus waters that are occasionally available after
"permanent" rights have been satisfied (the distinction is similar to that between junior and
senior appropriative rights in the Western United States). The goal was to promote
additional irrigation in areas where the most secure supplies were already taken. BAUER,
supra note 6, at chap. V, n.16.
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of water uses." On the other hand, several provisions suggest that nonconsumptive rights are subordinate to more traditional consumptive uses.
The most important such provision is Article 14, which defines nonconsumptive rights and requires that "the extraction or restitution of waters
shall not damage the rights of third parties to the same waters, in terms of
their quantity, quality, substance, opportunity of use, and other details."67
Other articles of the Code declare that consumptive rights can be freely
bought and sold without regard to the effect on non-consumptive rights,
while the latter face extra restrictions on exercising rights-of-way over
others' property." However, even Article 14 fails to spell out any further
guidelines about how non-consumptive rights can be used. Instead, the
Code requires that rules be determined individually for each right when it
is formally granted or acquired.
Second, the rules for decision-making within vigilance committees
are biased in favor of non-consumptive rights. Vigilance committees, or
juntas de vigilancia, are the largest water users' organizations in Chile, made
up of different canal associations that take water from the same river. The
committees are essentially federations of individual canals, covering part
or all of a river basin. Their main function is to enforce the distribution of
waters according to the rights of different canals.' Traditionally, the
committees have been composed almost entirely of irrigators. Under the
present Code, however, the owners of non-consumptive rights are members
of vigilance committees as well. Important decisions within the committees
are made by majority vote of the members, who cast votes in proportion to
their water rights." But the Code's drafters apparently failed to notice that
because there is a separate right for each non-consumptive use of the same
water, the non-consumptive rights will outnumber and outvote the consumptive rights in any river that has more than one hydroelectric plant.7
In practice, the committees remain dominated by irrigators, who in self-

66. For example, the Code does not recognize priorities when new rights are granted.
See supra notes 42 and 43, and accompanying text.
67. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, art. 14 (Chile 1981).
68. Id., arts. 15, 97. Article 97 also imposes other obligations on the owners of nonconsumptive rights: in exercising a right-of-way they cannot detain the flow of water
without permission from the owners of consumptive rights, they must avoid sudden surges
and reductions of flow, and they cannot prevent consumptive rights-holders from modifying
their own canals or closing them for maintenance.
69. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, arts. 263-82 (Chile 1981).
70. Id., arts. 222, 276.
71. The bias in voting rights seems to have been inadvertent rather than deliberate,
according to off-the-record interviews with people informed about the drafting of the Water
Code, although it is difficult to know. BAUER, supranote 6, Chap. V, text at n.19, and chap.
Il.
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defense tend not to invite their non-consumptive members to meetings. The
power companies, in turn, deny the committees' authority over them.
The conflicts between consumptive and non-consumptive rightsholders have been sharpest in the management of dams and reservoirs.
Power generation and irrigation have conflicting seasonal demands for
water. Power companies want to store water in the summer to supply high
national electric demand in winter, while farmers want to store water in the
winter for use during the summer growing season. The will to cooperate is
undermined by a deeply rooted, single-use mentality about water rights.
Irrigators tend to consider a river "theirs" because it has long supplied their
canals, regardless of the later appearance of other water users and rightsholders. Power companies, on the other hand, which have built and paid for
dams and reservoirs, take for granted their freedom to manage the works
as they choose. The Water Code's ambiguity about the relationship between
the two uses reflects that, when it was drafted, there was little discussion
about the future privatization of the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad
(ENDESA).7 Before its privatization in the late 1980s, there seemed little
need to take regulatory precautions because the dams were state-owned
and water management was under state control. The military government
did not modify the Water Code when it privatized ENDESA and the
company's water rights were included among its assets.
Finally, for certain key reservoirs the rules for coordinating
irrigation and hydroelectric uses were established decades before the
current Water Code. In both the Maule and No Bo River basins, state
agencies in charge of irrigation and electric power development signed
formal agreements to convert a natural lake into a reservoir, which meant
to cooperate in building, financing and operating the necessary storage
works.' The agreements are still in effect and have provided some stability
in river basin management, although their wider context has become much
more complicated in the past decade.

72. ENDESA is the National Electric Company. It was created in 1943 to develop a
nationwide system of generating and distributing power. Since privatization, it has been one
of Chile's largest and most profitable corporations. See, e.g., Eduardo Bitrhn & Rail SAez,
Privatizationand Regulation in Chile,THE CHILEANCONOMY: POLICY LESsON AND CHALLENGES
329-77 (Barry P. Bosworth et al. eds., 1994); DOMINIQUE HAcHu'TrE & ROLF LuDEns
SCHWARZENBERG, LA PRIVATIZACION EN CHILE (1992).
73. The agencies were the Irrigation Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and
ENDESA.
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V. CASE STUDY: IRRIGATION AND HYDROELECTRICITY IN
SOUTH-CENTRAL CHILE
This section focuses primarily on the Maule River basin, and
secondarily on the Bio Bo River basin farther south.'
(1) Background
Chile relies heavily on hydroelectric power, taking advantage of
favorable geographic conditions. Rain and snow fall in the Andes
Mountains that run north-south for thousands of kilometers along the
border with Argentina. Rivers are short and steep: they drop fast out of the
mountains and foothills, where hydroelectric potential is highest, and then
move west across the narrow central valley before cutting through the low
coastal range to the Pacific Ocean. Hydroelectric power supplies about 75
percent of the national electric grid, the Sistema InterconectadoCentral(SIC).'
Nonetheless, except for Lake Laja, Chile's reservoirs have little or no storage
capacity from one year to the next. Most hydroelectric plants are basically
run-of-the-river, called de paso or de pasada.
Two river basins in south central Chile, the Maule in Region VII and
the Laja in Region VIII, have produced over half of the SIC's energy since
the 1970s. The Laja River, which begins at Lake Laja, is the largest tributary
of the Blo Bio. In the late 1980s, the Laja basin's three hydroelectric plants
produced about 30 percent of the SIC's total power while the Maule basin's
four plants produced approximately 25 percent.76 Since then, the Maule's
share has been growing. In 1991, a fifth dam, Pehuenche Dam, discussed
below, raised the basin's share to 40 percent of the SIC, and by 1996 a sixth
plant had come on line while two more were under construction.
The Maule River basin is the site of the country's first serious clash
between irrigation and hydroelectricity. The basin is part of Chile's
traditional agricultural heartland, dominating Region VII some 250
kilometers south of Santiago. The basin has about 200,000 irrigated

74. See Maps I and 2 located at the end of this article.
75. Central Interconnected System. The SIC covers Regions III-X and serves ninety
percent of the nation's population. The SIC has seventy-five percent of the total national
generating capacity. The other twenty-five percent is generated on a separate grid as well
as by several large mining operations in the northern desert (Regions I and II), where lack
of water forces reliance on thermoelectric plants burning fossil fuels. There are also small
isolated systems in the far south (Regions XI and XII). See COMIIsiON NACIONAL DE ENERGIA,
EL SECTOR ENERGIA EN CILE chap. 4 (1989).
76. CoMISION NAcIONAL DE ENERGIA, supra note 75; Rodolfo von Bennewitz, Recursos
Hidroelctricosde ia Cuenca de B(Ob(O, LA REGION DEL Blosto 83 (Colecci6n Terra Nostra No.18,

1990).
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hectares? and produces mostly staple crops and a small amount of fruit for
the domestic market.' Most of this acreage is in the uppermost "section" of
the river, which includes the foothills and most of the central valley. The
section has a total of thirty-four canals and some 10,000 irrigators who are
members of the Maule River Vigilance Committee.'
Hydroelectric development in the Maule basin began in the late
1940s, shortly before Chile passed its first Water Code.!' The source of the
Maule River is a mountain lake with the same name. In 1947, two state
agencies, the Irrigation Directorate (ID) and ENDESA, signed an agreement
to convert the lake into a dual-purpose storage reservoir. According to the
agreement, which is still in effect, each agency has the right to a share of the
lake's waters, which can be released separately as needed for different
downstream uses.' The agencies held the water rights in state ownership
until ENDESA's rights were privatized along with the company in the late
1980s. The ID manages the lake, delivering its own share free of charge to
private irrigators and canal associations in the central valley. The irrigators
themselves have no rights to nor control over the lake. However, they do
have prior rights to water in the Maule River and its many tributaries. 2
ENDESA has the rights both to its own share of the lake and to generate
power with the waters released by the ID for irrigation purposes. ' By the
mid-1960s, ENDESA had built a power-plant on the river a short distance
below the lake as well as a dam with a second power-plant on one of the
river's upper tributaries, the Cypress River.
Large-scale hydroelectric development began in the 1980s. In 1983,
the DGA granted ENDESA the basin's first non-consumptive rights for two
adjacent multi-purpose dams then being built where the river leaves the

The area is equal to approximately 500,000 acres.
78. This is about fifteen percent of the nation's total irrigated area. The principal crops
are grains, other annuals, and livestock pasture. COMISION NACIONAL DE RIEGO, ESTUDIO
INTEGRAL DE RIEGO DE LA CUENCA DEL Rio MAuLE (1977); GRUPO DE INVESTIGACIONES
AGRARjAs, SINTESIS ESrADISTIcA: 1991, VII REGION (Informe de Coyuntura Agraria No. 3,
1992).
77.

79.

COMMON NACIONAL DE RIEGO, supra note 78.

80. On the first Water Code, see citations, supra note 35.
81. Convenio Sobre Regulaci6n del Rio Maule, between Irrigation Department and
ENDESA, signed Sept. 2,1947, approved by Ministry of Public Works, Decreto Supremo No.
3341 (Nov. 11, 1947).
82. The distinction between water rights in lakes and water rights in the rivers that
drain them is an historical peculiarity of Chilean water law. This distinction arose as an
incentive to modify natural lakes in order to increase their storage capacity, by granting
rights to the waters thereby made available. In hydrological terms, it makes little sense to
consider a river separate from the lake that gives it birth, and the coexistence of both rights
adds to the confusion of the situation today. BAuER, supranote 6, chap. V, at n.38.
83. See Convenio, supra note 81.
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Andean foothills. The dams are called Colbiln and Machicura. Colbdn is the
larger reservoir; Machicura is immediately downstream." Use of the new
rights was required to avoid harming any existing consumptive rights, as
distributed and enforced by the river's vigilance committee. The grant
defined a month-by-month schedule of guaranteed minimum flows for the
rights-holders below the dams, flows which are highest during the summer
irrigating season. Since completion in 1985, the two reservoirs have been
operated jointly, with Machicura helping regulate the discharge to irrigators
below. ENDESA also built or modified the canal-works needed to deliver
water to irrigators affected by the project.' In 1984, the government granted
ENDESA additional non-consumptive rights in the upper Maule River and
in its main tributary, the Melado, for the future Pehuenche Dam. ENDESA
planned to locate the Pehuenche Dam on the Melado just before the two
rivers' confluence, some thirty kilometers upstream from Colbin. 86 In both
cases, the rights granted to ENDESA also declared the company to be a
member of the Maule River Vigilance Committee."
When the military government privatized ENDESA in the late1980s, it made the Colbin-Machicura Dams a separate company
("Colbn"), which remained in state ownership. The goal was to prevent
ENDESA's monopoly of the electric sector. The Pehuenche Dam, however,
was made a separate company but was bought almost immediately by the
newly-privatized ENDESA, to become a wholly-owned subsidiary.'
Colbgn was originally planned for both irrigation and power
development.! It was designed to include a large new canal to carry water

84. The water rights for Colbfn and Machicura were granted by DGA Res. No. 105
(Apr. 19, 1983).
85. Colbdn-Machicura had been studied as a regional development project since the
1960s, under the Chile-California Program of international aid and cooperation. See
JONATHAN W. BULKLEY & RONALD T. McLAUGHuN, SIMULATION OF POLITICAL INTERAMCON IN
MuLTuLE-PuRl'o
RiVER-BAsIN DEVELOPMENT (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Civil

Engineering, Hydrodynamics Lab. Rep. No. 100,1966); Esteban Doia Martinez & Ricardo
Espinoza, Andlisis Histdrico del Proyecto Canal Tronco Linares, in SEGUNDA CONVENCION
NAcIONAL DE REGANTES DE CHILE 303 (1989).
86. The rights for Pehuenche were awarded by special Presidential decree, which
avoided the auction that the Water Code would otherwise have required, since two canal
organizations had simultaneously applied for the same rights for a couple of smaller
hydroelectric projects. Ministry of Public Works, Decreto Supremo No. 312 (Oct. 10,1984).
Article 148 of the Water Code gives the President authority to bypass an auction and allocate
rights directly when it is justified by "exceptional circumstances and the general interest."
The DGA, the National Energy Commission, and the Governor of Region VII all
recommended that the President grant the rights to ENDESA. Direccifn General de Aguas,
Orden No.748 (Sept. 12,1984).
87. See Decreto Supreme No. 312, supra note 86; DGA Res. supranote 84.
88. See generally supra note 72.
89. For historical background, see generally supra note 85.
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nearly one hundred kilometers to the south, to supply water to much of the
Province of Linares. However, the Canal Linares was never built and
Colbon's management has been dominated by power generation, largely
because, when the twin dams were built in the early 1980s, ENDESA had
money to contribute while the ID did not. The military government refused
to finance big new irrigation projects, considering them a classic example
of state inefficiency?'e Electric power development, on the other hand, was
well funded. Therefore, ENDESA paid for the dams and assumed the right
to run them as it saw fit, as long as it released the required minimum flows
to irrigators. When Colb~n was made a separate public company, its water
rights and obligations remained the same. The present Concertaci6n
government has aimed to partially privatize Colbdn beginning in late 1996,
intending the new owners to compete with ENDESA.
(2) Conflict and stalemate in the Maule River basin, 1990-1992
Before 1990, there was relatively little friction between the two
competing water users, although irrigators objected to some provisions in
the DGA decree granting Colbfzn's rights. In particular, they protested that
the monthly definition of minimum flows restricted their access to water
during the summer months." More serious problems arose when ENDESA
finished the Pehuenche Dam in late 1990. In addition to blocking the flow
of the Melado, Pehuenche Dam also diverts water from the upper Maule
into its reservoir. After passing through the turbines, the combined water
is released back into the Maule kilometers downstream. Pehuenche Dam
has approximately the same generating capacity as Colbdn, though much
less reservoir storage?'
Pehuenche's construction was finished in November 1990, during
the third consecutive year of drought in central Chile. November is early
summer in Chile and regional tensions about water scarcity were high. The
company dosed the dam's gates in order to fill the empty reservoir so that
it could start generating power several months later as required by its
contract with the national electric grid. Irrigators downstream suddenly
found much of their water cut off just as the growing season moved into its
hottest and driest months. The irrigators protested to the Maule River

90. On the military government's irrigation policies, see generally supra note 45; Bauer,
supra note 5; BAuER, supranote 6, chaps. III and IV.
91. See Garda Huidobro Vald6s y Otros con Colbwn-Machicura (Ct. App. Talca 1989)
(unpublished) (on file with author); Ramfrez San Crist6bal con Colbiln-Machicura (Ct. App.
Talca 1989) (unpublished) (on file with author). See DGA Res., supra note 84.
92. The following account will often refer to Pehuenche because the company that owns
and runs the dam is legally distinct; but ENDESA is the real owner and decision-maker. See
supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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Vigilance Committee, which asked Pehuenche to let the water flow by the
dam.9 When the company refused, the Committee went to court.
The Vigilance Committee filed a recurso de protecci6n against the
Pehuenche Electric Company in the appellate court in Santiago." The
Committee argued that Pehuenche was violating the irrigators' property
rights by detaining the river-flow. Moreover, the Committee asserted that
the power company was treating non-consumptive rights as if they were
consumptive by storing the water, thereby making it unavailable
downstream. According to the Committee's argument, the company should
either wait until autumn to fill the reservoir, or buy the necessary rights
from Colbim-. Because Colbfin is downstream, such a deal would mean that
Colbti would release its own water to the irrigators, allowing Pehuenche
to accumulate the flows upstream. (Recall that the Colbfin-Machicura
Electric Company was still state-owned, and that the Concertaci6n was now
the government).
At first, both the appellate court and the supreme court ruled in
favor of the irrigators." The courts ordered Pehuenche to let enough water
pass to meet the irrigators' needs. However, the two decisions had key
differences. The appellate court reasoned at some length that nonconsumptive rights were subordinate to consumptive rights when the two
came into conflict, but said nothing about what Pehuenche's other options
might be.96 The supreme court, on the other hand, removed all discussion
of the priority of consumptive rights from the appellate court's decision,
and stated only that in this particular case the irrigators' property was
threatened. The court then referred the substantive conflict to the DGA to
resolve, despite the agency's limited powers to do so."
Several days later, in the height of summer, the DGA followed the
supreme court's lead and ordered Pehuenche to open its reservoir gates.9
The next day, the DGA approved a deal between Pehuenche and ENDESA

93. Recall that Pehuenche's water rights made it a member of the Vigilance Committee,
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. Junta de Vigilancia del Rio Maule con Empresa Elctrica Pehuenche (Ct. App.
Santiago 1990; Sup. Ct. 1991), 2 REVsTA DE DEREcHO DE MINAS & AGUAS 321 (1991).
95. Id.
96. See discussion supra,part IV.Chilean water law scholar Alejandro Vergara criticized
the Appellate Court of Santiago's reasoning, arguing that the Code has no preference.
Alejandro Vergara, Informe Constitucional No. 48 (1991).
97. The supreme court's deference to the agency was based on two rarely used
provisions in the Water Code. The first authorizes the DGA to settle problems caused when
water projects alter stream-flows. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, art. 303 (Chile 1981). The
second gives the DGA temporary power to redistribute waters during officially declared
drought emergencies. Water Code, DFL No. 1,122, art. 314 (Chile 1981). Article 303 has not
been construed as granting the DGA adjudicatory powers.
98. DGA Res. No. 36 Gan. 28,1991).
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to fill the reservoir with waters released from ENDESA's shares in the two
upstream reservoirs, especially Lake Maule. 9 A week later, Pehuenche also
agreed to pay Colbin to release water temporarily to the irrigators while
the new reservoir filled. The ID facilitated the transfer by releasing some of
its own reserve in Lake Maule, in part to relieve the irrigators and in part
as a loan to ENDESA, which the company would repay out of its share of
Lake Maule in the following year. The Vigilance Committee opposed the
transfer and appealed the DGA's decision. 1' ° The Committee argued that
ENDESA's rights in the upper reservoirs were non-consumptive by nature,
and therefore could not be used to fill a reservoir, which was a consumptive
use. The DGA rejected the argument and criticized the irrigators for
protesting the transfer even though they were not injured by it and had no
rights to the lake in any case.101
Meanwhile, through its Pehuenche subsidiary, ENDESA continued
to challenge the DGA's initial order to open the reservoir gates."0 ENDESA
outlined what would be its legal position in the future. The power company
argued that the Water Code established no priority between consumptive
and non-consumptive rights. Therefore, the DGA's actions protecting
irrigators undermined the property of power companies. ENDESA further
declared that non-consumptive rights must implicitly include the rights to
fill reservoirs and to regulate water-flow; any other interpretation of the
Code's language would defeat the whole purpose of hydroelectric
development."° The DGA flatly rejected ENDESA's position, stating that
the Code clearly required non-consumptive rights to work around preexisting consumptive rights.1' 4
The suits brought by ENDESA and the Vigilance Committee against
the DGA'" were consolidated and decided together, but the first round of

99. DGA Res. No. 38 (Jan. 29, 1991), 2 REvISTA DE DERECHo 0E MiNAs & AGUAS 330
(1991). As ENDESA's subsidiary, Pehuenche apparently paid nothing in exchange. BAUER,
supra note 6, chap. V.
100. Maule River Vigilance Comm., appeal for administrative reconsideration (Feb. 15,
1991) (unpublished) (on file with author).
101. DGA, Report to Ct. App. Santiago (Feb. 20,1991), 2 REvisrADE DERECHO DE M!NAS
& AGUAS 332 (1991). Both the ID and the DGA are in the Ministry of Public Works. The
Minister's control of the lake via the ID was his main leverage over the parties in the dispute.
Interview with Carlos Hurtado, former Minister of Public Works, in Santiago, Chile (Dec.
6, 1995).
102. See DGA Res., supranote 98.
103. Pehuenche Electric Company, appeal for administrative reconsideration (Feb. 21,
1991) (unpublished), appeal for judicial review (Mar. 19,1991) (unpublished) (on file with
author).
104. DGA, Report to the Controller General (Mar. 6, 1991) (unpublished) (on file with
author).
105. See supra notes 100; 103.
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conflict ended in stalemate, with the advantage to ENDESA. In March 1991,
the appellate court ruled once again that the irrigators' rights were being
violated, and ordered compliance with the decisions made in December and
January."° In April, the supreme court set aside the ruling, but chose to
avoid deciding the substantive issues."° By then, the harvest was over and
the rainy season was near. The supreme court convinced the private parties
involved-ENDESA, Pehuenche, and the Vigilance Committee- to agree
to a settlement dropping their suits without resolution of the issues. All
sides retained the right to argue the same positions in the future. In fact,
they would do so within the year. The Vigilance Committee in particular
accepted the settlement only because in practice it was too late; the
Pehuenche reservoir was already full."m
The next summer, the conflict intensified even though the drought
had ended during the intervening winter and the reservoirs were full. The
issue turned to Pehuenche's routine operation of accumulating water at
night and releasing it during the day, when electric demand was highest.
Although the reservoir's storage capacity is fairly small, it can regulate
flows on a short-term basis. Through the Vigilance Committee, the irrigators
protested the frequent and unpredictable changes in the flow reaching their
canals. The head of the DGA's regional office responded by ordering
Pehuenche to respect the "opportunity of use" of consumptive rights by
stopping all regulation and storage of the flow and operating as a strictly
run-of-the-river power-plant."°
ENDESA promptly sued the DGA for violating its property
rights.1 0 The power company denied the DGA's authority to regulate its
water use, arguing that it was up to private rights-holders to take legal
action if they were injured. The company insisted, as it had the previous
summer, that non-consumptive rights should not be defined so rigidly as
to prohibit any alteration of flow. Some degree of temporary storage, the
company argued, was essential to electric power development. In
ENDESA's view, the irrigators' rights were not harmed by brief delays in

106, See supranote 94.
107. Junta de Vigilancia con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1991; Sup. Ct. 1991), 2 REViSrA DE
DEREcHO DE MINAS & AGUAS 327 (1991). The Appellate Court of Santiago's decision is
criticized for several procedural flaws by Alejandro Vergara, Informe Constitucional No. 74

(1991).
108. See Junta de Vigilancia con DGA, supra note 107. For the view that the Maule conflict
shows that the Water Code should be reformed to clarify the superiority of consumptive
rights, see the interview with lawyer Mario Silva in REVLS'rA TATrERSALL No. 70, at 8 (1991).
109. DGA/Regi6n VII, Orden No. 716 (Dec. 11,1991). The phrase "opportunity of use"
comes from Water Code, DFL 1,122, art. 14 (Chile 1981), quoted supranote 67.
110. Pehuenche Electric Company, recursode protecci6n (Ct. App. Talca Dec. 27, 1991)
(unpublished) (on file with author).
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water delivery. In a rather forced interpretation, the company argued that
where the Water Code prohibited non-consumptive rights from interfering
with other rights' "opportunity of use," the true intent was to favor the
technical needs of power generation, not irrigation. 1 '
Farmers and the DGA were not ENDESA's only opponents in this
round of the conflict. In January 1992, Colbfin protested as well, since it was
in effect paying for the Pehuenche Dam's plan of operations. Because
Colbfin is legally obligated to release certain minimum flows to the
irrigators, it must moderate the fluctuations caused upstream by the
Pehuenche Dam. In other words, because ENDESA managed the flow at its
convenience to generate power when electric prices were highest, Colbfm
lost money by having to generate in off-peak periods. At one point, Colbon
briefly cut off some of its releases and blamed the Pehuenche Dam in order
to increase the irrigators' pressure on its rival.1 2 Soon after, the members of
the Vigilance Committee voted unanimously to ask Pehuenche to suspend
operations, as usual to no avail."3
The DGA agreed with ENDESA that the agency lacked authority
to order changes in water use. However, the agency rejected the company's
other arguments. The water rights for Pehuenche had been granted on
condition that they not interfere with others' pre-existing rights; in this case
they were clearly interfering. The grant said nothing explicit about the
power to regulate or store water-flow. The DGA denied that such powers
were implicit in non-consumptive rights since the Water Code neither
recognizes nor requires specific uses for water rights. The DGA's position
was firm: Pehuenche had no rights to alter the flow at all. According to the
DGA, the company's only legal option was to negotiate a solution with
other rights-holders.""
Throughout the dispute, the DGA's firmness was undermined by
pressures not to complicate electric power generation, which as a key
component of economic growth was a high governmental priority. Both the
National Energy Commission and the agency that manages the national
electric grid told the DGA that Pehuenche's operation should not be tightly
restricted because its production was so vital to increasing energy supplies;
without it, either electricity prices would rise or rationing would become

111. Id.
112. Letter from Alvaro Gonzalez, General Manager, Colbfin-Machicura Electric
Company to Santiago Letelier, President, Maule River Vigilance Committee (Jan.14, 1992)
(on file with author); letter from Jorge Bachmann, President, Maule Sur Canal Association
to Gustavo Manrfquez, Director, DGA (Jan. 21,1992) (on file with author).
113. Acusan a Pehuenchepor Mal Uso de Aguas, EL MERCURIO, Jan. 22,1992.
114. DGA, brief (Ct. App. Talca 1992) (unpublished) (on file with author). See also letter
from Gustavo Manulquez, Director, DGA to Ernesto Silva, General Manager, Pehuenche
Electric Co. (Jan. 6,1992) (on file with author).
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necessary. The two energy agencies believed that injuries to irrigators could
be readily
n s prevented by coordinating Pehuenche's operation with
Colbin's.
Taking its cue from the supreme court, the Appellate Court of Talca
also refused to address the substance of the issues. Instead, in January 1992,
it insisted that Pehuenche and the irrigators choose a pair of expert arbiters
to negotiate an agreement. 116 At the same time, Pehuenche and Colbdn
reached a temporary compromise in which Pehuenche agreed to moderate
restrictions. A nationally prominent senior lawyer and law professor,.
Alejandro Silva Bascufth, was named chief arbiter. However, with the end
of the drought, the process again slowed to a crawl. More than four years
later it remained unresolved. In the meantime, the most important event in
multiple water use was the court battle over the first dam on the Bio Blo
River, the Pangue project.
(3) Multiple use conflicts in the Bio Bo River basin
The Bio Bio River is one of the largest and most economically
important rivers in Chile. It dominates Region VIII, 250 kilometers south of
the Maule, and supplies four major water uses: irrigation, hydroelectricity,
a variety of industries, and urban consumption. Urban consumption is
particularly heavy in Concepci6n, the regional capital located at the river's
mouth...Since the 1960s, the lower Blo Blo has suffered serious urban and
industrial pollution. The basin has a more complex history of multiple-use
water problems than other Chilean rivers, partly because of its larger size.
Unlike the Maule, however, the Blo Bio has no vigilance committee.1
While the Bio Bfo's main stem was not dammed until the mid1990s, its northernmost tributary, the Laja River, was the country's biggest
hydroelectric producer for years. 1 ' Like the Maule, the Laja River begins at
a mountain lake which was converted to a reservoir by ENDESA and the ID

115. Letter from Sergio Lorenzini, Executive Secretary, Nat'l Energy Comm'n to DGA
(Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author); letter from Germin Guerrero, President, Centro de
Despacho Econ6mico de Carga, to DGA (Dec. 20,1991) (on file with author).
116. Res. (Ct. App. Talca Jan. 29,1992) (on file with author).
117. With over 700,000 people, the Concepci6n metropolitan area is the second largest
in Chile, after Santiago. INTENDENCIA DE LA REGION DEL BkO BtO, ESTRATEGIA PARA EL

DESARROLLO REGIONAL: LA REGION DEL BID B|O AL ENCUENTRO DEL SIGLO XXI 14 (1991).
118. The basin has about 175,000 irrigated hectares. For more detailed discussion of the
Bio Bfo basin, see BAUER, supranote 6, chap. V. See also FRANCESCO FARANDA ET AL, SINTESIS
DEL PROGRAMA EULA (1993); USO DEL SUELO Y MANEJO DE LOS RECURSOs HIDRICOS EN LA
CUENCA DEL Bio-Bio (Francesco Faranda & Oscar 0. Parra eds., 1992); CAMILO MURCIA,
ORIGEN, USO Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL RIO B|O BIO (1988); CAMILO MURCIA, US,

MANEJO Y

DEARROLLO DE LA HOYA HIDROGRAPiCA DEL RIO BIO-Bio (1988); Von Bennewitz, supra note

76.
119.

See supra note 76.
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as a result of a 1958 agreement. The agreement still controls the rules of
operation.' Unlike the Maule, Lake Laja is run by ENDESA and is the only
reservoir in Chile big enough to provide multi-year storage. Such storage
is critical because Chile is heavily dependent on hydroelectricity, making
the lake the "reserve battery" of the entire national power grid. For
example, ENDESA drew heavily on Lake Laja during the drought of 198891.2 The lake's strategic importance is further reflected in national electric
rates, which since the early 1980s have been calculated by a model based on
the lake's marginal costs of operation."z
A. The Laja River Example
This article describes two of the most important multiple water use
conflicts in the Bo No basin. Both illustrate the combination of administrative and judicial formalism that characterizes the Chilean legal system.
In the first case, the conflict began in 1984 when two forest industries
simultaneously applied for new consumptive water rights in the Laja River.
Both companies planned identical projects to transfer the water northward
out of the basin to a future hydroelectric plant on the Itata River." When
there is not enough water to satisfy simultaneous applications, the Water
2 The
Code directs the DGA to hold an auction for the available rights."
proposed transfer was strongly opposed by downstream water users in the
Bio Bo basin and by some government agencies. Opponents protested that
it would dry up the famous Salto del Laja waterfall and increase the
concentration of pollution in the lower Bo No. In November 1985, the DGA
decided to hold the auction anyway. Several interest groups in Concepci6n
responded by filing a recurso de protecci6n claiming that the auction violated
their constitutional right "to live in an environment free of contamin12
ation." 5

120. Conveno Sobre Regulaci6n del Rio Laja, between Irrigation Directorate and
ENDESA, signed Oct. 24,1958, approved by Ministry of Public Works, Decreto Supremo No.
2534 (Oct. 29,1958).
121. Enrique Mhrquez, El Proyecto Laja-Diguill(n, Faranda & Parra eds., supra note 118,
at 67-70. Colbgn, in contrast, although one of Chile's largest reservoirs, can store only 20-25%
of the Maule's annual flow. Interview with Jorge Gilvez, Engineer, Irrigation Directorate,
Santiago, Chile (Apr. 19,1993).
122.

COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA, supra note 75.

123. The projects are described in Soto con Director General de Aguas (Ct. App. Santiago
1986; Sup. Ct. 1986), 334 FALLDS DEL Mas 584 (1986).
124. See generally supra note 43, and accompanying text.
125. This environmental right can be defended by a weaker recurso de proteccif, as
discussed supra note 23. In light of the environmental recurso'sadded restrictions, it is not
clear why the plaintiffs chose not to assert stronger constitutional rights as well.
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The DGA responded to the recurso by stating that, although it
recognized the problem and had tightened conditions on the new rights, it
had no regulatory power over pollution control. That authority belonged
instead to the National Health Service and to municipal governments. As
a result, the DGA argued that it was required to auction the rights even in
the face of declining water quality. Six months later, both the Appellate
Court of Santiago and the supreme court rejected the recurso and fully
supported the DGA's position."l ' The courts ruled that the DGA's actions
in keeping strictly to the letter of the law had been neither "arbitrary" nor
"illegal," and that since there were no procedural errors the judges were not
required to probe the substantive constitutional issues. In practice, the suit
served the plaintiffs' purpose by buying them time to negotiate a political
solution. The Minister of Public Works intervened and eventually the two
forest companies abandoned their projects in the interests of good public
relations.' However, it was a troubling sign of how administrative
formalism could combine with judicial formalism to sidestep a tough problem.12
B. Pangue Dam Example
The second case concerned the Pangue Dam on the upper Bio Bo,
the river with the country's greatest hydroelectric potential. ENDESA began
studying the river's potential in the 1950s and eventually identified six
possible projects." The projects would double the nation's total 1990
generating capacity. Pangue is the first of the projects to be built, beginning

126. See Soto con Director General de Aguas (Ct. App. Santiago 1986; Sup. Ct. 1986), 334
FALLOS DEL MES 584 (1986).

127. The attempted auction triggered several years of regional efforts to better coordinate
basinwide water management, mostly unsuccessful. In the 1990s very similar problems have

arisen with another inter-basin transfer, the Irrigation Directorate's "Laja-DiguillWn" canal
project. See BAUER, supranote 6, chap. V.
128. The following year the DGA and the appellate court of Santiago reached a similarly
formalistic decision in another inter-basin transfer case. A mining company bought
agricultural land with water rights in the upper Aconcagua River Valley in order to transfer
the water to the upper basin of the Mapocho River for industrial purposes. When the DGA
approved the transfer, it was sued by a hydroelectric company and by the Aconcagua River
Vigilance Committee, both downstream in the Aconcagua Valley. They claimed injury,
arguing that the rights in question should be reclassified from consumptive to nonconsumptive in view of their importance downstream. The DGA replied that it had no power
to do so, nor could it restrict the mining company's use of its rights unless there were thirdparty damages (apparently ignoring the plaintiffs' claims). The Appellate Court of Santiago
ruled for the DGA, asserting somewhat inconsistently that only the ordinary civil courts
could adjudicate such a conflict, but refusing to investigate the matter. See Generadora
Elkctrica Sauce-Los Andes con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1987), 83 GAcrA JURIDICA 67 (1987).
129. See Von Bennewitz, supra note 76.
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in the early 1990s.'" Although the reservoir is fairly small, basically a runof-the-river operation, its environmental and cultural impacts have sparked
national and international controversy. The World Bank was one of the
project's major supporters, lending money through the International
Finance Corporation, the Bank's arm for lending to the private sector.'3 The
project exposed an isolated area to development. The area contains unique
ecosystems and is inhabited by several thousand indigenous people known
as Pehuenche (no relation to the dam of the same name). Within Chile,
Pangue was also symbolic as the first major environmental dispute under
the more open political conditions of the newly elected government of the
Concertaci6n. Many environmentalists hoped that the new government
would be more sympathetic to their concerns than the military had been.
On the whole, however, the Concertaci6n government has supported the darn, echoing many of the arguments made by ENDESA. According
to the project's proponents, the country's rapid economic growth continues
to increase the demand for electricity, and hydroelectric power reduces the
import of fossil fuels and is non-polluting, although it has other environmental impacts. In addition, the government wants to encourage private
capital investment in infrastructure of all kinds. ENDESA itself has
argued that its opponents have exaggerated the dam's negative impacts and
ignored the company's efforts to mitigate those impacts. The company voluntarily commissioned two environmental impact assessments, even
though it was not required by law to do so. The first assessment recommended more study before going ahead with the project; the second assessment was more favorable. The debate in Chile has been extremely
polarized, with many of Pangue's critics describing the project as a total
catastrophe while ENDESA has denied or discounted nearly all environmental concerns."

130. Like the Pehuenche Dam, Pangue Electric Company is a subsidiary of ENDESA. See
citations infra note 133.
131. See, e.g., GRUPO DE ACCON POR EL Blo Blo, EL PROYECO HIDROELgCTRICO DEL ALTO
BIo Blo UNAAMENAZA PARA EL MEDIO AMBmNTE YEL PUEBLO MAPUCHE-PEmHENCHE DE CHn.
(Documento de Trabajo 1992). The GABB has been the principal Chilean organization
coordinating the opposition to Pangue. The International Rivers Network, based in Berkeley,
California, has played a key role outside the country. For a more detailed discussion of the
Pangue controversy, see BAUER, supra note 6, chap. V.
132. See MIDEPLAN, Divisi6n de Planificaci6n Regional, Informe Econ6mico Social y
Ambiental del Proyecto Pangue (1992) (unpublished report, on file with author).
133. For arguments in favor of Pangue, see Carlos Maturana, El DesarrolloHidroel.ctrico
del Alto B(o Bfo y los Estudios del Medio Ambiente, in MURCIA, USO, Manejo YDesarollo supra
note 118, at 73; PANGUE ELECRIMC COMPANY, ENVutONMEmrAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PANGUE
PROJECr (1991); Von Bennewitz, supra note 76. The first environmental impact study was
done by the Universidad de Concepci6n. See Universidad de Concepci6n, Estudio Preliminar
para la Evaluaci6n del Impacto Ambiental del Sistema de Centrales Hidroel6ctricas del Alto
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For the purposes of this article, the most important aspect of the
dispute was the legal conflict over the dam's effects on downstream flows
and water rights. In 1993, the coalition of environmental and indigenous
organizations opposing the dam, represented by Chile's most famous
environmental lawyer, Fernando Dougnac,"" filed a recurso de protecci6n
against ENDESA."1 They claimed that the Pangue Dam violated their
constitutional rights to live in a clean environment, in part because the
dam's storage of water would reduce downstream flow and increase the
concentration of pollutants. A group of irrigators with consumptive water
rights also joined the plaintiffs. This gave the suit more legal weight by
adding property rights claims to the environmental arguments.1"' The
irrigators feared that Pangue's operation would expose them to alternating
low water levels and sudden surges, over which they would have neither
control nor advance information. Dougnac elaborated on the arguments the
DGA and the Vigilance Committee had made earlier in the Maule River
conflict: the only reasonable interpretation of the Water Code was that nonconsumptive rights had to work around prior consumptive rights, not vice
versa. ENDESA could not alter the flow at all without the irrigators'
consent, and certainly could not store and release it at will. In its defense,
ENDESA repeated its position in the Maule case that non-consumptive
rights must include temporary storage and flow regulation, and that this
does not significantly harm consumptive rights-holders or the environment.
Even when the flow was cut off at Pangue, the dry channel would begin to
recharge several kilometers below the dam from groundwater and other
tributaries. The company argued that the project's impact had been
exaggerated. 37
In June 1993, just as its counterpart in Santiago had done when first
confronted with the problem, the Appellate Court of Concepci6n ruled
against ENDESA. The court interpreted the Code to mean that non-

Bfo Bfo,Convenio ENDESA/Universidad de Concepci6n (1988) (unpublished) (on file with
author). For a critique of the second study, see Centro EULA, An~lisis del Informe de
"Evaluaci6n de Impactos Ambientales del Proyecto Pangue" Realizado para Pangue S.A. por
Ecology & Environment, Inc. & Agrotec Ltda. (1992) (unpublished) (on file with author);
Grupo de Acci6n por el Blo Bo, supra note 131.
134. Dougnac had won what was probably Chile's most famous environmental case in
1985, blocking an irrigation project that would have partly drained Lake ChungarA in a

National Park in northeastern Chile. Palza y otros (CODEFF) con Direcci6n de Riego y
Ministerio de Obras Pfiblicas (Ct. App. Arica 1985; Sup. Ct. 1985), 66 GAcErA JURIDICA 21
(1986).

135. Orrego con Empresa El&ctrica Pangue (Ct. App. Concepci6n 1993; Sup. Ct. 1993), 158
GACETAJURIDICA 52 (1993).
136. On the difference between environmental recursos and other recursos,see supra note

23.
137.

See supranote 135.
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consumptive rights did not include flow regulation if it injured
consumptive rights. The court also held that the DGA's grant of water rights
for Pangue explicitly required a minimum flow and prohibited sudden
surges, conditions that the dam's plan of operation seemed likely to violate.
As a result, the court ordered ENDESA to halt construction until it had
either modified the plan or reached a compromise with the affected water
rights owners. The victory for the dam's opponents highlighted the
tension underlying their alliance. While the environmentalists wanted to
block the dam entirely, irrigators and other water users might be satisfied
with a compromise whereby ENDESA agreed to pay compensation and
obey certain rules of reservoir management.
The appellate court's decision triggered six weeks of heated
national debate before it was reversed by the supreme court. For the first
time, the supreme court abandoned its protection of the property rights of
consumptive users, and ruled on the substantive issues. It fully accepted
ENDESA's arguments in favor of non-consumptive rights, and dismissed
the plaintiffs' claims as exaggerated and premature. In part, the court relied
on a DGA report in which the agency reversed its position in the Maule
case. The report said that the Pangue reservoir did not threaten downstream
water rights, although its operation should be monitored in case of
problems in the future. Therefore, the court allowed ENDESA to proceed
with Pangue's construction, and said that any injured parties could sue
later, after the injuries had occurred.139
Under other circumstances, the supreme court's apparent lack of
formalism might be a welcome sign. The extreme positions of the different
parties seem to call for a compromise since neither kind of water right can
reasonably be given complete supremacy over the other. Hydroelectric
development has important benefits that would be severely limited by
prohibiting all regulation of river flow. Nonetheless, such development
should have some obligations to other water users and should include real
consideration of environmental protection and energy conservation.
Similarly, while irrigators must live with growing demands and
interference by newer water users, they should not have to bear the burden
of adjustment alone. However, although the court flirts with substance, its
decision is ultimately formalistic. Its decision rests on the essentially
procedural grounds that no immediate injury is threatened, even though
future problems are easy to foresee. The court's decision also takes a narrow
and superficial approach to policy by defining one kind of property right
in isolation from others, and by dismissing environmental concerns.

138. Id.
139. Id. The DGA's report is discussed in the supreme court's decision.
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By accepting ENDESA's winner-take-all interpretation of the law,
the supreme court abruptly announced significant limitations on the vested
property rights of consumptive water users, without requiring nonconsumptive users to concede anything in exchange or even to agree to any
restrictions in the future. The Pangue decision resulted in a major transfer
of wealth from farmers and the agricultural sector to the power companies:
a political decision with significant distributional consequences. One
Chilean law professor has pointed out, partly tongue-in-cheek, that this was
the supreme court's first decision using law-and-economics since it ruled in
favor of the most economically valuable resource use."0 However, the
court's move was too simplistic. It missed a vital opportunity to promote a
balanced compromise with broader legitimacy among water users or to call
for new legislation to clarify the situation. Moreover, the court left the
conflict and the bad will between the parties to fester. In October 1996, the
Pangue reservoir was filled and downstream rights-holders still did not
know, or have any control over, its plan of operations. 41 The coordination
problem will only get worse when ENDESA builds a second dam upstream,
called Ralco, which will have a much larger reservoir and storage capacity.
Environmental issues and the situation with the Pehuenche Indians remain
pending, 142
recently forcing the World Bank to withdraw its support for
ENDESA.

(4) Continuingdevelopment and stalemate in the Maule River basin, 1993-95
The supreme court's Pangue decision was soon repeated in the
Maule River conflict. Despite the arbitration process under way since 1992,
the exchange of lawsuits has continued, with the irrigators generally losing
but refusing to give up. They continue to challenge DGA Resolution No.105,
which limited the irrigators' previous rights to the river's entire flow by
specifying the minimum flows that Colbtin had to release each month.'"
While irrigators have benefited from Colbin's more secure water supplies,
they are also bound to its calendar: they cannot extend their irrigating
season to meet the different water needs of the new export crops that many
would like to introduce. They also have protested their loss of operational
control over the infrastructure for water delivery. True to form, in May
1992, the Appellate Court of Santiago rejected such a challenge by one of the
Maule canal associations, on the procedural ground that the organization

140. Interview with Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, Law Professor, University of Chile Law School,
Santiago, Chile (Nov. 25,1995).
141. In theory, Pangue has agreed to maintain a "minimum ecological flow" at a level
that the company itself established according to its own criteria. Telephone Interview with
Gonzalo Benavente, Engineer, Pangue Electric Co. (Dec. 13,1995).
142. See citations, infra note 167.
143. DGA Res., supra note 84.
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had no standing to sue on behalf of its members without their explicit agreement.'" A year later, the Maule River Vigilance Committee lost a similar
case protesting against the ID's management of Lake Maule. The Appellate
Court of Talca found that the ID had complied with the 1947 agreement and
confirmed that the irrigators had no claim to the lake in any case.' 45
Two months after the Pangue decision, the appellate courts of both
Santiago and Talca used the supreme court's ruling to settle cases involving
the original clashes over Pehuenche Dam in 1991. The Santiago court
referred to Pangue in dismissing renewed suits against the DGA by
ENDESA, through its Pehuenche subsidiary, and by the Maule River
Vigilance Committee. In opposite ways, each suit protested the agency's
actions during the reservoir's initial filling.'" Similarly, the Talca court
ruled squarely for Pehuenche in a suit against the DGA's December 1991
order to stop altering flows. Both Colbdn-Machicura Electric Co. and the
Vigilance Committee joined the DGA in arguing for some restrictions on
non-consumptive rights; however, the court denied the DGA's power to
intervene and invoked the Pangue rule allowing temporary interruption
and storage of flow. Again, the court refused to offer any further guidance
as to how to balance the conflicting rights. Instead, it left the problem to the
arbiters and said that injured parties could sue later if necessary.4 7
Meanwhile, the arbitration process has moved slowly and has
narrowed in scope. Both the Vigilance Committee and the DGA withdrew
from the process after 1992 as negotiations came to focus solely on the
relationship between the Pehuenche and Colbdin-Machicura Dams.
Presently, the two power companies agree that Pehuenche has the right to
alter the river-flow, but disagree about Colbin's claim that it should be
compensated for moderating the impact on irrigators. In spite of the legal
uncertainty, both companies have been building new, medium-size, run-ofthe-river power plants, scheduled to come on line in 1995-97. Colbdn has
added one plant below the Machicura reservoir before the reservoir's
outflow returns to the river. ENDESA has added two more plants on the
144. Asociaci6n de Canalistas del Maule con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1992), 89 REVISrA
later the supreme court confirmed,
without explanation (Nov. 28,1994) (unpublished) (on file with author).
DE DERECHO & JURISPRUDENCIA 65 (1992). Two years

145.

Junta de Vigilancia del Rio Maule con Direcci6n de Riego/Regi6n VII (Ct. App.

Talca 1993), 4 REVSrAD DRECHoDE AGUAS 250 (1993).
146. Pehuenche con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1993) (unpublished) (on file with author);
Junta de Vigilancia del Rio Maule con DGA (Ct. App. Santiago 1993), 90 RMmSrA DE DERtECHO
&JURISPRUDENCIA 161 (1993). See DGA Resolutions, supra notes 98 and 99.
147. Pehuenche con DGA/Regi6n VII (Ct. App. Talca 1993) (unpublished) (on file with
author). A dissenting opinion, highly unusual in water cases, argued that the Water Code
was too vague, that third-party injuries were too likely, and that the whole problem was too
complex for a quick procedure like the recursode protecci6n. Id. See DGA Order, supra note

109.
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Maule River, upstream from the Pehuenche reservoir, called Loma Alta and
Curillinque. The basin now contains a total of eight hydroelectric plants.
Nonetheless, there is still no agreement, either between the power
companies or involving the irrigators, about how they are all to be
coordinated."
In short, water rights in the Maule basin are uncertain and conflict
in several ways. The ID and private irrigation groups worry that the
region's agricultural development has stagnated because of confusion over
water rights titles and because of the growing dominance of hydroelectric
power.'4" Those two factors have helped prevent an active local water
market: there are more paper rights than "wet water," the scope of consumptive rights is in doubt, and the hydroelectric infrastructure limits the
possibilities for redistributing water.' Part of the ID's motivation in sorting
out these problems is to find enough water to supply the proposed Canal
Linares southward from Colbdn, which it still hopes to build." Meanwhile,
the DGA has implemented its own program to regularize water titles, following criteria
that are more generous than those used by its sister
2
agency. S

Among different power companies, the rules for coordinating dams
are still unclear. The companies seem to expect problems to be handled
through the regulatory framework of the electric sector rather than the
Water Code or the DGA. However, regulations governing the generation an
transmission of power were not designed to account for other water uses.
In addition, Chile's electric laws and regulations have been criticized for
allowing excessive monopoly power and concentration, making them and
untrustworthy guide for river basin management.""' Finally, the conflict
between irrigation and hydroelectricity continues unabated. Irrigators
resent the power companies for doing whatever they please, blame the

148.

Part of the pressure behind Colbfin's expansion is the government's plan to begin

to privatize the company in late 1996, motivating it to stabilize and improve its legal and
financial position.
149. Direcci6n de Riego/VIL Asignaci6n de los Derechos de Aprovechamiento de la Zona
de Maule Sur, Orden No.233 (Mar. 29,1995).
150. Uncertain titles and rigid infrastructure are two important constraints on water
rights markets throughout Chile. See Bauer, supra note 5; BAUER, supra note 6, at chap. IV;
Rios BREHM & QuRoz CAsTRO, supranote 36.

151. For background on the Canal Linares, see Dofa Martfnez & Espinoza, supra note 85.
152. DGA, Anhlisis de IaDisponibilidad y Uso de las Aguas Superficiales del Rio Maule,
Informe Final (1995). On regularization of water titles, see Bauer, supra note 5; BAUER, supra
note 6, chaps. II, IV.
153. See Bitrin & SAez, supra note 72.
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government for letting them get away with such behavior, and continue to
organize lawsuits and political pressure."
VI. REFORMING RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
When the Concertaci6n government came into power in 1990,
reforming the Water Code was part of its agenda. After two years of
preparation, including public discussion and comment, the DGA and the
President sent a package of reforms to Congress in December 1992.'5 The
reforms aimed to tighten some of the more "permissive" aspects of the
Code, particularly the articles allowing speculation and non-use. They also
expanded somewhat the DGA's administrative duties. The most controversial proposal would have declared forfeit any water rights not used for
a five-year period. Private sector interest groups and the rightwing political
parties in Congress eventually rejected the proposal."s
However, neither the government's proposals nor the resulting
public debate raised the issues discussed in this article. There was almost
no mention of the conflict between consumptive and non-consumptive
water rights. There was no discussion of guidelines for managing multipurpose reservoirs, no proposals either to modify the existing compacts
governing Lake Maule and Lake Laja, or to try to negotiate a new
agreement in any other river basin. Moreover, no one mentioned the role of
the courts or the policy implications of their decisions. The neglect of these
issues is surprising in view of their importance and controversy, and in
large part reflects their political sensitivity.
The debate came closest to addressing these issues when it
confronted the topic of river basin or watershed management."s7 River basin
conflicts did not become a serious problem in Chile until the 1980s, despite
some early concern in the 1960s.lso In recent years, sustained economic

154. A recent World Bank mission to Chile reached similar conclusions about the Maule
situation, commenting that the inter-sectoral conflict, although serious, had intensified by
institutional failures. John Briscoe, Water Resources Management in Chile: Lessons from a
World Bank Study Tour (World Bank internal document, Jan. 1996).
155. REPOSLICADE CHI , Proyecto de Ley que Modifica el C6digo de Aguas, Ministerio
Secretarfa General de IaPresidencia, Mensaje No. 283-325 (Dec. 2,1992). The government's
policies are further explained in Direccd6n General de Aguas, Bases para laFormulaci6nde la
Polftica Nacwnal de Aguas, 2 REVIsA DE DEmcHO DE MINAS & AGUAS 259 (1991); DGA, Actas
del Serminariosobre Polftica Nacional de Aguas, 4 REVIsrA DE DcREcHo DE AGUAS 159 (1993);
Gustavo Manrlquez, Polftioa Nacionalde Aguas: Formulacidn, Objetivos, Instrumentos, Opciones,
Alternativasy Proposiciones,1 DECHOEN LA REGION No. 1, at 65 (1992).
156. The debate over this proposal is discussed in Bauer, supra note 5, at 650-51, and
BAUER, supra note 6, chap. IV.
157. Referred to as manejo de cuencas.
158. For historical background, see BAUER,supra note 6, chap. V.
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growth has increased pressures on water resources throughout the country.
The specific problems of water quality and quantity vary from one region
to the next, but the common diagnosis is that current institutional arrangements cannot adequately coordinate water uses. By 1990, river basin management was a familiar topic in Chilean water policy circles, steadily promoted by two United Nations agencies, the Food and Agriculture
Organization and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean.'" There has been considerable debate and a wide range of
positions taken about how to improve the situation. Some would prefer to
continue relying on voluntary cooperation by the interested parties. Others
have proposed creating a new administrative organization with real
enforcement power. Some have proposed limiting participation to private
rights-holders, while others would include only the relevant state agencies.
Still others would prefer various combinations of public and private
participation.' °
In its reform package, the government proposed creating new
regional agencies for selected river basins. These "administrative corporations" would be hybrid agencies, composed of the major public and
private actors in basinwide water use. The new agencies would include the
participation not only of water rights owners and their organizations, but
also government agencies, state enterprises, municipal governments, universities, and other private sector and non-governmental organizations. The
proposal did not discuss many details about how the new agencies would
work: for example, the procedures for making and enforcing decisions, the
proportions and voting rights of different members, the source and amount
of financing, or the agencies' powers and duties in relation to existing
organizations. Nor was there any mention of non-consumptive rights. 6'
The DGA's proposal was fiercely criticized for being heavy-handed
and vague. Neoliberals and other right-wing interest groups blasted the
river basin agencies for the same reasons they rejected the other elements
of the reform package: the proposal was a "statist" attempt to undermine
property rights and the free market, reminiscent of the dark days of the

159.

See, e.g., COMISION EcONOtmCA PARA AMbRCA LATiNA Y EL CARIBE, BASES

CONCEPTuALESPARALAFORMULAaONDEPROGRAMASDEMANEjODECuENCASHIDRGRAiCAS,

Informe LC/G.1749 (1992); FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, PRIMER CONGRESO
LATINOAMERICANO DE MANEJO DE CUENCAS HIDROGRAiCAS: INFoRME FINAL Y MEMORIAS DE

LAS COMISIONES DE TRABAJO (1991).

160. See works cited supranote 159. See also CENTRO DE NvEsIGACI(N YPLANIFICACION
DEL MEDiO AmBIENTE, supra note 50; Humberto Pefra, Caracterizaci6n de los Sistemas
Hidrol6gicosen Cuencas Chilenas Respecto de su Contaminaci6n, in, PROTECCION DEL MEDIO
AMBIENTE 219 (Herman Schwember ed., 1990); Fernando Peralta T., DescripcidnGeneral del
Manejo de Cuencas, in SEGUNDA CONVENCION NAaONAL DE REGANTES DE CHILE 134 (1989).
161.

See Bitrim & Sdez supranote 72.
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Agrarian Reform. Many water users and canal associations feared losing
their autonomy to a new and unknown bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the critics
differed in their preferred solutions. The more ideological critics claimed
that the present Water Code and water market were working fine and no
changes were called for."2 Others agreed with the government that basinwide management was needed, but favored improving existing users'
organizations rather than creating new ones. Such reform would require
strengthening and expanding the vigilance committees, whose inability to
regulate multiple uses was evident in the Maule River basin. In any case,
the proposal's critics rejected the idea of widening the basin agencies to
include people who had no water rights."3
Opposition to the proposed reforms forced the government to
withdraw all of its proposals by late 1993. It is unclear how the basin agencies would handle the issue of consumptive and non-consumptive rights because it would entirely depend on the details of their structure and function.
The critics' fears of massive state intervention were exaggerated, since in
general, the Concertaci6n government understood that placing new
restrictions on property rights would be unconstitutional and politically
impossible without the political support of the right-wing and the private
sector. In fact, in view of the political context it is hard to explain why the
DGA put forth such an ill-defined proposal, apparently doomed to
opposition and defeat. Since 1994, the Chilean government has continued
to argue for some sort of river basin organization, but has moved the issue
far down on its agenda because of its complexity and political sensitivity.
Proposals about multiple water use were not included in the new package
of Water Code reforms that the President sent to Congress in July 1996.1"
EPILOGUE
Several recent events have kept these river conflicts alive and in the
public eye. First, in early 1997, Chile's Anti-Monopoly Commission ruled

162. Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, supra note 39; Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura,

C6digo de Aguas: Observacionesde la SNA al Proyecto que Modifica la Ley, EL CAMPESINO, June
1993, at 8.

163. See generally CENTROOB INVESrGACION Y PLANIPICACION DEL MEDio

AMBIENTE,

supra

note 50; CONFEDERACON DE CANALSTAS DE CHIE, TERcmRA CoNvENciON NACIONAL DE
REGANTES DE CHILE (1993); ENDESA, El Derecho de Aprovechamiento de Agua en Chile:
Visi6n de ENDESA (1993) (unpublished) (on file with author); Figueroa, supra note 39. Only
ENDESA discussed the Code's omissions about the relationship between consumptive and
non-consumptive rights and the building and operation of reservoirs, but ENDESA
suggested no alternatives.
164. REPILIUCA DE CHmLe, Formula Indicaciones al Proyecto de Modificaci6n del C6digo
de Aguas, Ministerio Secretarfa General de la Presidencia, Mensaje No. 005-333 (1996).
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in favor of the DGA in a dispute with ENDESA over ENDESA's
applications for new non-consumptive water rights. The Commission
accepted the DGA's argument that granting ENDESA more rights would
unduly restrict competition in the electric sector." Second, the summer of
1996-97 was Chile's worst drought year of the century. In addition to
agricultural losses, reservoirs were drained so low that the government
finally had to impose electricity rationing until the arrival of the winter
rains." s Third, ENDESA's dams on the upper Bfo Bo River remain bitterly
contested. In 1996-97, international pressure forced the World Bank to
investigate ENDESA's compliance with the social and environmental
conditions of the Bank's loan for Pangue. When confronted with the Bank's
questions, ENDESA pre-paid the loan and secured other financin& a highly
unusual procedure. The planned second dam, Ralco, has been given
qualified approval by the government and is now the focus of national and
international opposition." Each of these events has kept the issues in the
public eye and highlighted the fact that they are by no means fully resolved.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that Chile's legal and institutional system
has done a poor job of coordinating multiple water uses and river basin
conflicts. These are tough problems for any system, among the most
complex in natural resource management since private actions have many
third-party effects and external costs and benefits. There are no easy
solutions. Nonetheless, the Chilean experience shows that a laissez-faire
approach that relies mainly on private bargaining is not sufficient and in
some cases makes conflicts worse. Together Chile's 1981 Water Code and
1980 Constitution established a neoliberal framework for water management, made up of strong private property and economic rights, free market
transactions and limited state regulatory authority. A stronger judiciary
with greater powers and responsibilities backs up the framework. It is a
textbook example of Chicago style law-and-economics. River basin conflicts

165. Comisi6n Preventiva Central Anti-Monopolios, Dictamen No. 992/636 (Nov. 26,
1996), Comisi6n Resolutiva Central Anti-Monopolios, Resolucifn No. 480 (Jan. 7,1997). See
also Bitrin & Siez, supra note 72.
166. See, e.g., Emergencia Elictricapor Sequfa: Los Costos de una Tardanza, EL MERCURIO,
Apr. 20,1997, at B1,B4.
167. Erica Adshead & Christiin Opaso, Second Bob~o Dam Hits Choppy Water, 10 WORLD
RIVES REV., Jan. 1996, at 1,4; Glenn Switkes, Chilean Dam Builders Slip Through the Noose, 12
WORLD RIVESs RE., Apr. 1997, at 11; Pilar Molina, Conservaro Producir,EL MERCURIO, Mar.
23,1997, at D4, D6.
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have put this framework's capabilities to the test, and thereby revealed
some crucial flaws'I
Within the agricultural sector, the current framework has had
mixed results, on balance perhaps positive. Water users strongly support
the increased legal security of property rights, which has helped to consolidate the local canal associations that are responsible for day-to-day water
management. On the other hand, market trading has been quite limited, and
market incentives designed to raise irrigation efficiency have been largely
ineffective.' Beyond agriculture, however, the institutional framework has
been more severely strained. Problems of multiple water uses and relations
among different economic sectors have been hard to sort through. In many
areas the problems continue to be a source of serious conflict. Relying on
private bargaining to internalize external costs has not been effective.170
In two of the country's most important river basins, the Maule and
the Bo Bfo, private bargaining has failed to resolve conflicts between the
owners of consumptive and non-consumptive water rights, i.e., between
irrigators and hydroelectric companies. Because private rights are so strong
relative to the state water agency's regulatory authority, the bigger and
more powerful water users have little incentive to negotiate. The electric
companies in particular have little to fear either from the DGA or from
smaller water users. Irrigators, on the other hand, have less bargaining
power because they have less economic and political clout and face higher
transactions costs in organizing themselves. Moreover, the electric companies are national political players while the irrigators' influence is more
local and regional. Private water users' associations (vigilance committees)
have been unable to settle these disputes or to impose their decisions on
their non-consumptive members. As a result, the disputes have repeatedly
ended up in court.
Under the current Constitution, the judiciary has broad powers to
review state administrative actions. Both the DGA and the higher courts
share a strong preference for strict interpretation and legalistic behavior. In
routine matters, this combination of administrative and judicial formalism'
works fairly well; the DGA is careful to observe the limits of its authority,
and the courts generally defer to its technical expertise while occasionally
correcting administrative errors or abuses. With harder problems, like those
raised by non-consumptive water rights, the combination is less effective.
When faced with substantive policy issues and ambiguous laws, the DGA

168.
II.
169.
BAUER,
170.

For further discussion of Chile's institutional model, see BAUER, supra note 6, chap.
On the Water Code's impact in the agricultural sector, see Bauer, supra note 5, and
supranote 6, chap. IV.
Comparewith Rosegrant & Binswanger, ROSEGRANT &GAzbMURL supranote 1.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

has tended to adopt a legalistic position in order to defend itself from
criticism. The agency has been so wary of stepping beyond its explicit duties
that it has been passive more often than assertive. This behavior has been
reinforced by the scrutiny of the Controller General and is clearly what the
military regime intended in the 1980 Constitution." However, the judiciary
has also often ducked its own larger responsibilities. The courts have found
formal or procedural reasons to avoid the substance of difficult issues, or
they have ruled superficially based on insufficient analysis of the range of
interests at stake. Unfortunately, the supreme court has led the way in this
respect, and in Chile the supreme court exerts172strict and centralized control
over the rest of the nation's judicial system.
These institutional arrangements have left a partial vacuum in
public decision-making, involving precisely the difficult issues that demand
political judgment. The most direct way to straighten out the uncertainty
about consumptive and non-consumptive water uses would be through
new legislation. Indeed, to work well and avoid paralysis, the current institutional model seems to require regular intervention by the law-making
branches of government, i.e., the President and the legislature. So far, such
intervention has been prevented by political deadlock and eclipsed by other
governmental priorities. More troubling is that the irrigation-hydroelectric
clash is a fairly straightforward problem, albeit difficult. The model's limitations are more serious in other river basin conflicts with added layers of
complexity. Problems such as water pollution from urban, industrial, and
agricultural sources, the protection of minimum flows for environmental
purposes, inter-basin water transfers, and groundwater management have
worsened with continued economic development.
In this context, creating new basinwide organizations as they are
currently discussed in Chile would almost certainly be ineffective. The
private economic rights of their members, who may refuse to comply with
new regulations, would handicap such organizations. How the division of
authority between the basin organizations and existing state agencies would
be established is not clear. Sorting it out in practice would be slow and
complicated. Even if the new organizations had some adjudicatory powers
over their members, they would not replace the ordinary court system and
would themselves be subject to judicial review through the recurso de
proteccid6n.Ultimately, to be effective, the organizations would have to rest
on some kind of legal agreement negotiated by their members, both public
and private, dealing explicitly with the constitutional and property rights
issues. Such agreements between ENDESA and the Irrigation Directorate
have provided stable rules for managing certain reservoirs for decades.

171. On the Controller General, see supra note 62.
172. See BAuER, supra note 6, chap. II at note 35 and accompanying text.
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However, those agreements were signed when both parties were state
agencies and followed the government's instructions. To expand this
pattern to include other water users too would require a degree of political
determination and consensus that is highly unlikely under present
circumstances and that will not likely appear until the problems get worse.
Finally, Chile's experience with river basin management shows
some of the limitations of the free market approach to environmental
policies. Many proponents of these policies, especially economists, tend to
oversimplify the legal, institutional and political conditions needed for them
to function well. This article has emphasized two such conditions: effective
and legitimate processes of defining property rights and resolving conflicts.
Because orthodox economic theory focuses on markets and exchange, that
theory prefers to define property rights as commodities: private, exclusive,
and transferable. However, with the physical environment this neglects
many difficult issues. Natural resources are physically inter-connected and
different resource uses affect one another, directly or indirectly. New definitions of property rights thus affect not only their owners, but also other
resource owners and users. Property rights to nature affect collective
interests and consist partly of overlapping rights to use shared resources,
rather than private freedom to alienate and exchange. Because the social
relations of resource use are complicated, transactions costs are necessarily
high and there are major distributional consequences." In short, "defining"
property rights must take place within legal and political institutions, with
concerns beyond the marketplace. 74
A related conclusion is that neoliberal economics ignore or oversimplify what is involved in conflict resolution, the quintessential judicial
function. The judicial process is fundamentally different from the
commodity logic of the market and remains an unknown for most economic
theory. Markets work by comparing things that are qualitatively different
by the common numerical standard of price, which reduces things' concrete
characteristics to an abstract and quantitative measure of value. While this

173. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHERICOFOWERSHI 163-96 (1994); Bonnie G. Colby, TransactionsCosts and Efficiency in

Western Water Allocation, 72 AMER. J.AGRICULTURAL EcON. 1184-92 (1990). Richard Posner,
supra note 1, at 32-33, 54-57, has said that exclusive property rights are inefficient if
transactions costs are high, though this is hardly the position for which he is famous.
174. This broader social perspective on property rights can be found in YORAM BARZEL,

ECONOMIC ANALYSISOF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); Daniel W. Bromley, Land and Water Problems:
An InstitutionalPerspective, 64 AMER. J. AGRICULTURAL EcON. 834 (1982); DANIEL W. BROMLEY,
ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1991); PROPERTY:
MAINSrREAM AND CRrICAL POSITIONS (C. B. MacPherson ed., 1978); ROSE, supra note 173; SAX,
supranote 39; E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HuNrERs: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK Acr (1stAm.
Ed. Pantheon Books 1975).
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encourages private exchange, it is not of much use in settling conflicts over
resource uses, which are precisely about specific qualities and concrete
differences. Resolving conflicts requires qualitative measures of value and
a qualitative logic, to weigh and choose among a web of rights, rules,
purposes, and interests. This again is an inherently judicial and political
task, for which private bargaining and exchange cannot substitute. The
same is true of internalizing externalities."
The capacity to resolve conflict is especially critical in a neoliberal
legal and economic model, a model built around broad private rights and
liberties and a minimal state. This capacity depends on the judicial system,
which must control state regulation and balance private rights. The courts
must be fairly independent from other branches of government, and willing
and able to rule on disputes with substantive policy implications. This judicial model resembles the constitutional and common law traditions of the
United States more than the civil law tradition of Latin America. Free market economics is a predominantly U.S. intellectual tradition and it seems to
implicitly assume the framework of the U.S. legal system. However, Latin
American legal systems and constitutional arrangements are different from
the U.S. model. The courts are more subordinate and formalistic, seeking to
avoid political and other non-legal factors, while the executive branch commonly has stronger centralized authority than in the United States. 76 Many
Latin American countries have recently adopted neoliberal economic policies and institutional reforms, such as privatization and deregulation of a
variety of sectors, without realizing the constitutional implications. The role
of the judiciary becomes more strategic as state regulatory authority is
reduced -in this way fundamental judicial reform is critical to the longterm success of neoliberal economics."z The Chilean experience reminds us

175. This argument draws on work in institutional economics. See generally JOHN R.
COMMONS, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONSOF CAPITALISM (1924); see also THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
AGRARIAN INSTITUTIONS 3-17 (Pranab K. Bardhan ed., 1989); Bromley, supra note 174;
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, EcoNoMics AND INSrTmONS: A MANIFESTO FOR A MODERN
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1988).

176. Richard Posner, for example, a prominent Chicago law-and-economics figure,
assumes an activist policy-oriented judiciary that can resolve conflicts when transactions
costs are high, supra note 1,at 49-50. See also Ugo Mattei &Mauro Bussani, Making the Other
Path Efficient, in, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (Edgardo Buscaglia & Robert D.
Cooter eds., 1995). On comparative law and judiciaries, see supra notes 18, 29, and 31.
177. The World Bank has begun to recognize this. See EDGARDO BuCAGLIA & MARIA
DAKOLIAS, JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICAN COURTS: THE EXPERIENCE IN ARGENTINA AND

ECUADOR (World Bank Technical Paper No. 350, 1996); MARIA DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL
SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM (World Bank Technical
Paper No. 319,1996); MALCOLM ROWAT rT AL., JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN (World Bank Technical Paper No. 280,1995).

Winter 19981

NEOLIBERAL MODEL ON CHILE

153

to broaden the field of law-and-economics. The economic analysis of law
and politics should be balanced by the legal and political analysis of
economics.
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Map 1: Maule River Basin
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